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Articles
Contextual Healing: What to Do About
Scandalous Trademarks and Lanham Act 2(a)
MEGAN M. CARPENTER*
Offensive trademarks have come to the forefront of trademark policy and practice in recent
years. While it was once true that more attention had been paid to Lanham Act section 2 (a)
in the pages of law reviews than in the courts,' recent cases have focused attention on the ban
on registration of offensive marks and the widespread impact of this ban on trademark
owners, including a case before the Supreme Court this term. In this Article, I answer the
fundamental question: Given the problems previous research has identified, what should be
done about the 2 (a) bar for scandalous marks?'
This Article argues, as a preliminary matter, that the registration bar for scandalous marks
be removed from the Lanham Act because morality is outside the function and purpose of
trademark law. Furthermore, removal of the bar would be in line with other forms of
intellectual property, which have moved away from regulating morality. Finally, removing
the bar would resolve concerns about the constitutionality of section 2(a). However, if the
2 (a) bar remains part of the Lanham Act, it should be applied in a way that is fair and
effective within the legal framework of trademark law. Specifically, this Article argues that
trademark examiners should evaluate offensiveness in the same way other bars to
registration-and content in broadcast media-are evaluated: by considering the context of
the marketplace.
* Professor of Law and Founder and Co-Director of the Center for Law and Intellectual Property
at Texas A&M University School of Law. I am indebted to the research assistance of Mary Garner, as
well as to the participants in the Chicago Intellectual Property Colloquium (2o16), Intellectual Property
Scholars Conference (Chicago, 2015), Fordham Intellectual Property Conference (2o16), and Works in
Progress in Intellectual Property Conference (Arlington, 2015) for helpful feedback and commentary.
i. Christine Haight Farley, Stabilizing Morality in Trademark Law, 63 Am. U. L. REV. IOI9, IO20
(2014). Additional articles on the topic include, e.g., Megan M. Carpenter & Kathryn T. Murphy, Calling
Bulls **t on theLanham Act, 49 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 465 (2oII); Jasmine Abdel-Khalik, To "Live in In-
"Fame"-Y Reconceiving Scandalous Marks as Analogous to Famous Marks, 25 CARDOzo ARTS & ENT. L.J.
173 (2007); Megan M. Carpenter & Mary Garner, NSFW: An Empirical Study of Scandalous Trademarks,
33 CARDOzo ARTS & ENr. L.J- 321 (2015); Anne Gilson LaLonde & Jermone Gilson, Trademarks Laid Bare:
Marks That May Be Scandalous or Immoral, 101 TRADEMARK REP. 1476 (20II); Michelle B. Lee, Section 2(a)
of the Lanham Act as a Restriction on Sports Team Names: Has Political Correctness Gone Too Far?,
4 SPORTS LAw. J. 65 (1997); Regan Smith, Trademark Law and Free Speech: Protection for Scandalous and
Disparaging Marks, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 451 (2007).
2. See, e.g., In re Tam, 808 F.3 d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, II2 F.
Supp. 3 d 439 (E.D. Va. 2015).
3. In my previous scholarship on the subject, I discussed problems with both the application and
interpretation of the ban and completed an empirical study of rejections under section 2(a). Carpenter
& Murphy, supra note I; Carpenter & Garner, supra note i.
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INTRODUCTION
Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act prohibits registration of trademarks
that are "scandalous" or "immoral." In my previous research, I have
identified two relevant questions regarding this aspect of the 2(a) bar:
First, can (and does) the Lanham Act effectively bar registration of
scandalous and immoral marks? Second, should it do so? The first
question was the central inquiry of two articles on the subject. Calling
Bulls**t on the Lanham Act discussed some initial practical problems
with the interpretation and application of 2(a).' The second piece
provided an in-depth, empirical study of this prohibition.! In order to
best normatively evaluate the effectiveness of the bar and to determine
4. See generally Carpenter & Murphy, supra note i (discussing practical problems with the
interpretation and application of section 2(a)).
5. See generally Carpenter & Garner, supra note i (providing an empirical study of the
prohibition on scandalous or immoral trademark registration).
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whether it should be removed, it is critical to know how the provision is
being applied in practice throughout the registration process. While
many scholars have written on the morality provisions of the Lanham
Act, this was the first empirical study of scandalous marks. Through an
examination of the trademark records for 232 marks, the project
examined why marks were being rejected for scandalousness, what
evidence was being used in the rejections, what inconsistencies exist
throughout the process, and what the practical impact of these rejections
may be on the use of trademarks in the marketplace, either by the
original applicants or otherwise.6 This empirical project demonstrated
that the application of the 2(a) bar for scandalous marks is inconsistent
and ineffective.
This Article tackles the second question head-on. First, it argues
that the 2(a) bar should be removed because the Lanham Act should not
bar registration of trademarks that are deemed scandalous or immoral.
The bar is inconsistent with both the object and purpose of trademark
law and the evolution of morality bars in intellectual property law
generally, and it may be unconstitutional.
However, there are reasons to think that the bar may not be
overturned. If that is the case, how can it be applied in a way that is
effective, fair, and in harmony with the body of trademark law? In
response to this question, the bulk of this Article argues that 2(a) would
be more effectively applied if trademark examiners considered limited
contextual factors in their analysis of trademark registration applications;
consideration of context is consistent with other bases for rejection and
other forms of content regulation. Specifically, this Article argues that
trademark examiners should conduct a 2(a) analysis for scandalousness
by considering the mark in the context of the relevant marketplace. This
solution is in line with the overarching body of trademark law, which
evaluates trademarks in context. Marks are often rejected for being
"scandalous" in the abstract based on dictionary definitions that note a
particular term is "offensive" or "vulgar." These refusals fail to consider
whether a mark is scandalous in the context of the relevant marketplace
for goods and services identified in the application, which should be a
material aspect of the inquiry.
This Article's proposal would bring the morality bar in line with the
general body of trademark law, which focuses on trademark rights not as
rights in gross, but rights appurtenant to a particular business.8 Context is
6. Id.
7. See In re Tam, 8o8 F.3 d at 1329.
8. United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus CO., 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918) ("The asserted doctrine is
based upon the fundamental error of supposing that a trade-mark right is a right in gross .... There is
no such thing as property in a trade-mark except as a right appurtenant to an established business or
trade in connection with which the mark is employed.").
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a common consideration throughout the registration process, and
examining attorneys routinely consider contextual factors in other areas
of trademark registration, most notably in a likelihood of confusion
analysis, but also for refusals on a variety of bases, including
descriptiveness, functionality, and deceptiveness.9 In fact, it is unusual
not to consider marketplace context in the application process. If we are
going to prohibit registration of marks that are scandalous or immoral,
that evaluation should consider context in the same way that other
registration bars do.
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I traces the role and function
of trademarks over time, and identifies core functions of trademarks as
source identifiers and mechanisms for consumer protection. These
functions support the efficiency of consumer search costs and incentivize
producers to invest in the goodwill of their goods and services. Part II
argues that the bar on registration of scandalous marks should be
removed; in order to stay in line with its core function and developments in
intellectual property law generally, trademark law should move away from
considering scandalousness as a bar to registration. This would be
consistent with recent case law on disparaging marks, and with other
forms of intellectual property, which have moved away from regulating
morality. While in the past copyright and patent regimes conditioned
acquisition or maintenance of rights on the morality of works or
inventions, they no longer do so.
The second half of this Article contemplates the retention of 2(a)
within the Lanham Act. Part III proposes that while the registration bar
is in existence, it would be more effectively applied if trademark
examiners considered contextual factors in their analysis. So long as the
bar is in effect, we should interpret and apply it in a way that is effective,
fair, and in harmony with the body of trademark law. Consideration of
context is further consistent with other forms of content regulation. Part
IV discusses the relevance of context in trademark registration,
particularly with regard to likelihood of confusion-the key DuPont
factors considered by examiners in a likelihood of confusion analysis of
an application, for example, all focus on aspects of context. Similarly,
other registration bars, such as descriptiveness and functionality, focus
on aspects of context. Finally, Part V demonstrates that this proposed
change would be consistent with other forms of content regulation, which
have evolved to accommodate context.
9. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, TMEP § 1207 (Apr. 2016).
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I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF TRADEMARK FUNCTION
A. TRADEMARKS HAVE DEVELOPED THROUGHOUT HISTORY TO PROTECT
SOURCE QUALITY, NOT MORAL QUALITY
The type of consumer protection at the base of trademark law is not
a moral one. Trademarks serve to identify a source of goods and services
and to distinguish them from others. Toward that end, trademarks have a
strong qualitative component. However, the quality with which
trademark law is concerned is source quality; moral quality is not part of
the core function and purpose of trademark law, and it should not be.
i. Trademarks Developed as Source Identifiers
The historical development of trademarks demonstrates a focus on
source quality. While trademark law is a relatively recent phenomenon,
trademarks as identifying marks of ownership or source predate reading
and writing. Cave paintings in Europe and wall paintings in Egypt, dating
from the late Stone Age or early Bronze Age, both show the act of cattle
branding, which was likely the first use of a trademark.0 The verb "to
brand," in fact, is derived from the Old English brand or brond, meaning
"firebrand" or "piece of burning wood."" In 1552, the word "brand"
signified "identifying mark made by a hot iron," but by 1827, this use had
broadened to "a particular make of goods." 2
Trademarks worldwide have historically served to identify a source
of goods and services. Pottery found in Greece and Rome usually had
the maker's name inscribed on the handle. 3 Chinese porcelain had date
marks, and sometimes a maker's mark, the place of manufacture, or the
destination of the particular piece." Bricks and tiles from Egypt have
been found that contain identifying marks, including the inscription or
symbol of the monarch, and the particular building project for which the
bricks and tiles were to be used." Egyptian signboards, with distinct
marks and sometimes rebuses, have also been discovered.16 Hindu goods
Lo. Sidney A. Diamond, The Historical Development of Trademarks, 65 TRADEMARK REP. 265,
266-67 (1975).
ii. Brand, ONLINE ETYMOLOGY DICTIONARY, http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=brand&
allowed in frame=o (last visited Nov. 7, 2016).
12. Id.
13. Diamond, supra note II, at 267; Gerald Ruston, On the Origin of Trademarks, 45 TRADEMARK
REP. 127, 132 (1955); Benjamin G. Paster, Trademarks-Their Early History, 59 TRADEMARK REP. 551,
553 (1969).
14. Diamond, supra note II, at 267; Paster, supra note 14, at 552.
15. Diamond, supra note II, at 268; Paster, supra note 14, at 552-53; see also Ruston, supra note
14, at 131.
L6. Diamond, supra note II, at 272.
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dated from 13oo B.C. were traded between India and Asia Minor and
regularly utilized trademarks to indicate source. 7
Over time, trademarks grew to represent the goodwill of their
producers. Historian Sidney Diamond notes the proliferation of potters'
marks used on Roman goods, particularly oil lamps, during the period 35
B.C. to 265 A.D.-approximately iooo marks have been identified as in
use during that period of time.'8 Since then, trademarks have been an
integral aspect of trade. After a decline in the Dark Ages, the Medieval
Period saw the development of personal marks, proprietary marks, and
geographical appellations. 9 Personal marks included coats of arms, seals,
and house marks.20 House marks identified a family in residence and
were literally affixed to a house. If a member of that family became a
business owner, the house mark became a way of signifying the source of
the business, as well.2  Sometimes house marks were also placed on
goods, either of a particular family business or of the household
generally. Proprietary marks on goods enabled individuals to identify
their tools and other articles, including farm animals, in the event they
were lost or stolen.23 Geographical indications were often placed on
goods that were likely to be part of a broader stream of commerce, such
as tapestries and cloth. Some tapestries also contained what would be
the equivalent of a certification mark, certifying a particular level of
quality for the goods.5 It is also claimed that during this period, in 1544,
Charles V pronounced by edict that marks identifying the city of origin
and maker were required on tapestries.26 The punishment for trademark
infringement was amputation of the right hand.
17. Id. at 270.
L8. Id. at 271; see also Paster, supra note 14, at 553-54. Of particular success was the FORTIS brand;
FORTIS brand oil lamps have been found as far away as France, Germany, Holland, England, and Spain.
The wide range of brand distribution may be attributed not only to the success of the FORTIS brand, but
also to other incidental novelties. Brian J. Winterfeldt, Historical Trademarks: In Use Since. . . 4,000 B.C,
INT'L TRADEMARK Ass'N BULL., Mar. 2002, http://www.inta.org/INTABulletin/Pages/HistoricalTrademarks
InUseSince4oooBC.aspx; Rossella Lorenzi, Roman 'Factory Town' for Oil Lamps Found, NBC NEWS (Dec.
5, 2008, 1:27 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/28o72Io9/ns/technology and science-science/t/roman-factory-
town-oil-lamps-found/#.WBaNLSorJaQ (discussing the discovery of pottery center where oil lamps used in
the ancient Roman Empire were made). Perhaps the FORTIS brand was one of the first broad trademark
counterfeiting operations. Or, perhaps the mark FORTIS became the first generic designation, signifying a
particular type of oil lamp rather than a brand.
19. Paster, supra note 14, at 555.
20. Diamond, supra note ii, at 272; Ruston, supra note 14, at 136-38.
2L. Diamond, supra note ii, at 272-73; see Ruston, supra note 14, at 136-38; Paster, supra note
14, at 560-6i.
22. Diamond, supra note ii, at 273; Ruston, supra note 14, at 136-38.
23. Diamond, supra note ii, at 273.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 279.
27. Id. Diamond points out that the dates recorded for the identifying marks edict and the
punishment conflict, the former documented as occurring in 1544 with the latter documented in 1554.
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Ironically, between the invention of the printing press and the
development of the concept of copyright, it was the trademark that
governed original works fixed in a tangible medium. That is, where
works were not protected by copyright, their indication of source was
often determinative of their value. The trademark, for example, sat at the
center of competition in the publishing trade. Printers and publishers
competed for the most accurate version of a particular work, and in that
regard used trademarks as an identification of source. 8 Trademarks served
as the mechanism for protection of visual art, as well. In 1512 Albrecht
Direr brought a complaint against an individual who was copying his
works. 29 Rather than complaining about the copying of the work per se,
however, Direr asked that the individual be prevented from using "AD"
as a source-identifying mark.30 The Council of Nuremberg complied.3 '
Using trademarks as an indicator of source became commonplace
during the Industrial Revolution.32 From English pewter to French
porcelain to American silversmithing, trademarks became widely used in
the marketplace.33 In 1783, an English court held that to infringe a
trademark was fraud, and damages would be assessed accordingly.34
2. Trademarks Have Evolved to Identify Quality
From the cattle-brands of Egypt in the late Stone Age to the
proprietary and house marks in England during the Medieval Ages,
trademarks worldwide were clearly placed on goods to identify a
particular source. As the characteristics and functions of trademarks
have evolved over time, however, the property interest in trademarks has
grown stronger. In Gilson on Trademarks, Gilson notes that the
distinction between how a trademark operates and why it should be
protected is often blurred by courts, and, furthermore, that courts,
legislatures, and commentators have differed in their views over time
with changes in economy and culture.35
It is possible this discrepancy was due to a typographical error. Diamond further notes that there is no
documented evidence of enforcement; that is, no indication that any infringer's right hand was actually
cut off. Id. at 279-80. See Ruston, supra note 14, at 141 (dating Charles V's edict regarding punishment
of an infringer to 1554).
28. Diamond, supra note II, at 275; Ruston, supra note 14, at 139; Paster, supra note 14, at 558-
59. In fact, the works of Livy, published by Aldus of Venice, contain a warning against imitations in
the preface of the book. Diamond, supra note Lo, at 275.
29. Diamond, supra note II, at 279.
30. Id.
31. Id.; Paster, supra note 14, at 556-57.
32. See Diamond, supra note II, at 280-81; Paster, supra note 14, at 564.
33. Diamond, supra note II, at 281.
34. Singleton v. Bolton (1783) 99 Eng. Rep. 661 (K.B.). Yet, there was no explicit law of trademarks,
and no provision to try a case for trademark infringement.
35. I ANNE GILSON LALONDE, GILSON ON TRADEMARKS § .o3 (92nd rev. ed. 2016).
[Vol. 68:1I8
SCANDALOUS TRADEMARKS AND LANHAMACT2(A)
During the Industrial Revolution and ensuing developments of
economy and culture in the twentieth century, consumers became further
removed from the producers of goods. With technology and transportation
enabling mass production of goods, consumers drifted far downstream
from manufacturers in the stream of commerce. Furthermore, others
shared the waters-uppliers and merchants, both wholesale and retail,
were integrated into the supply chain. As consumers could no longer rely
exclusively on the trademark to identify a known producer of goods, they
began to rely on marks to identify a particular quality of goods and/or
services, for example, through the sales from a particular merchant.
In the United States, case law in the first half of the 1900s
demonstrates this shift from trademarks as exclusively source identifiers
to trademarks as identifiers of quality.6 In Hanover Star Milling Co. v.
Metcalf, for example, the Court held that "[t]he primary and proper
function of a trade-mark is to identify the origin or ownership of the
article to which it is affixed."37 The Court reasoned that the core of
trademark function is to designate goods as being from a particular
producer, and that consequently, trademark law bars others from
applying the same mark to the same goods, "because to do so would in
effect represent their goods to be of his production and would tend to
deprive him of the profit he might make through the sale of the goods
which the purchaser intended to buy."3 8 The Court summarized: "The
essence of the wrong consists in the sale of the goods of one
manufacturer or vendor for those of another."39 It was only slightly more
than a decade later that Frank Schechter, in his article The Rational Basis
of Trademark Protection, argued that the public had come to rely on a
trademark not for the origin of goods or services, but as a measure of
quality, and that trademark law should accommodate this shift in
function.0 In the latter half of the twentieth century, courts and
trademark owners honed in on the function of trademarks as a signifier
of quality in addition to source. Controlling quality began to be seen as
one of the key functions of the Lanham Act."
36. See, e.g., United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus CO., 248 U.S. 90 (1918); Hanover Star
Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403 (1916); Columbia Mill Co. v. Alcorn, 150 U.S. 460 (1893); Canal
Co. v. Clark, 8o U.S. 311 (1871) (supporting the idea that trademarks identify a particular source of
goods); see also In re Polar Music Int'l AB, 714 F.2d 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (acknowledging a material
shift from reliance on trademarks as source identifiers to quality identifiers).
37. Hanover Star Milling CO., 240 U.S. at 412.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 412-13.
40. Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 813, 824
(1927), reprinted in 6o TRADEMARK REP. 334 (1970).
41. For example, various cases discuss how ensuring quality is an important function of the Lanham
Act. El Greco Leather Prods. Co. v. Shoe World, Inc., 8o6 F.2d 392, 395 (2d Cir. 1986); Gorenstein
Enters., Inc. v. Quality Care-USA, Inc., 874 F.2d 431, 435 (7 th Cir. 1989). El Greco Leather also
specifically states that "[o]ne of the most valuable and important protections afforded by the Lanham Act
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This principle is enshrined in two separate places in the Lanham
Act. Of primary importance is the definition of a trademark itself, which
provides that a trademark can be any symbol that indicates the source of
goods "even if that source is unknown."" Also, section 45 of the Lanham
Act provides that a trademark may be "adopted and used by a
manufacturer or merchant."43 This provision recognizes that the
trademark does not always identify the producer of goods, and instead
can identify other entities in the stream of commerce. Lanham Act
provisions on trademark licensing support this shift from source to
quality, as well. Under the Act, the owner of a federal trademark
application or registration can license the right to use the mark to
another party, provided that the trademark owner retains control over
the nature and quality of the goods or services sold by the licensee under
the mark." As long as the trademark owner has adequate quality-control
mechanisms in place, he or she does not even have to use the mark, and
use by the licensee inures to his or her benefit."
In the consumer marketplace, these functions are at base a form of
consumer protection. When a consumer purchases a particular good or
service, associated trademarks serve as both an indicator of source and
an indicator of quality, facilitating and/or encouraging purchasing
decisions. This type of consumer protection, however, should not be
mistaken for one that safeguards the morality of consumers or shields
them in any way from offensive content. While trademarks have a strong
qualitative component, the quality with which trademark law is
concerned is source quality, not moral quality.
II. REMOVAL OF THE 2(A) BAR FOR SCANDALOUSNESS
In order to remain consistent with the core function and purpose of
trademark law, the registration bar for scandalous marks should be
removed. This would align with the movement of intellectual property
law generally, which has shifted away from regulating morality, and with
recent case law on disparaging marks. As previously mentioned in Part I,
while copyright and patent regimes once conditioned acquisition or
maintenance of rights on the morality of works or inventions, they no
longer do so. In addition, recent case law suggests that the 2(a)
is the right to control the quality of the goods. .. ." El Greco Leather, 8o6 F.2d at 395 (citing Menendez v.
Faber, Coe & Gregg, Inc., 345 F. Supp. 527 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd in relevant part and modified, 485 F.2d
1355 (2d Cir. 1973) and Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976)). It goes
on to also state that "the actual quality of the goods is irrelevant; it is the control of quality that a
trademark holder is entitled to maintain." Id. (citing Prof'l Golfers Ass'n of Am. v. Bankers Life & Cas.
Co., 514 F.2d 665, 670-71 (5th Cir. 1975)).
42. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2016).
43. Id.
44. Id. § 1055-
45. Id.
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registration bar for scandalous and immoral marks may be
unconstitutional.
A. OTHER FORMS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY HAVE MOVED AWAY FROM
CONDITIONING PROTECTION ON MORALITY
There has been a trend toward eliminating morality-based
restrictions in copyright and patent law. The prohibition on registration
for scandalous and immoral trademarks sets trademark law apart from
other forms of intellectual property by maintaining distinctions based on
morality.
i. Morality and Copyright Law
While Congress has generally construed the term "writings" found
in the Intellectual Property Clause of the Constitution broadly to cover
almost every type of literary property, "obscene" works were denied
copyright protection until fairly recently.46
The Miller test for obscenity paved the way for the modern view of
copyrightability for obscene works. The Miller test asks: (i) whether the
average person, applying contemporary community standards, would
find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (2)
whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual
conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and, (3) whether
the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value. The Court later defined "community" as the community
of the individual juror;'8 the "average person" to include both sensitive
and insensitive adults;49 and "prurient" to mean any lust that is not
"normal."o
46. See Hoffman v. Le Traunik, 209 F. 375, 379 (N.D.N.Y. 1913) (holding that works must be
"free from illegality or immorality" to obtain copyright protection); contra Mitchell Bros. Film Grp. v.
Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 916 (1980) (removing
immoral standard). Throughout history, courts have formulated different definitions of and tests for
obscenity. The Supreme Court first attempted to define obscenity by attending "Movie Day," where
the justices would gather together with their clerks to view the adult films that were the subject matter
of the obscenity cases before the Court. Christopher Thomas McDavid, Note, I Know It When ISee It:
Obscenity, Copyright, and the Cautionary Tale of the Lanham Act, 47 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 561, 563
n.ii (2009) (noting "that neither Justice William Douglas nor Justice Hugo Black ever attended Movie
Day, as they rejected the argument that any expression could be banned. Black famously commented,
'If I want to go see that film, I should pay my money."' (citing BOB WOODWARD & Scorr ARMSTRONG,
THE BRETHREN 198 (1979))).
47. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
48. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 105 (1974).
49. Pinkus v. United States, 436 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1978).
50. Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 498 (1985).
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a. Historical Morality Bars in Copyright Law
In the past, copyright protection was denied to offensive works
because they failed to progress science and the useful arts. The common
law bar to copyright of obscene works is thought to have originated in
England, when a publisher sought damages for the unauthorized sale of
his work by a subsequent publisher." In Stockdale v. Onwhyn, the court
held that the work in question was "libelous and licentious" and that "it
would be a disgrace to the common law should a court of justice protect
from piracy a work on an indecent nature." 2 The California Circuit
Court in Martinetti v. Maguire adopted the Stockdale doctrine when it
denied relief in an infringement action because the work in question did
not fit within the boundaries of the Intellectual Property Clause.53
Because the play featured "scant and meaningless" dialogue, "the
exhibition of women in novel dress or no dress," and consisted "mainly
'of women lying about loose,"' it did not promote science or the useful
arts." The court elaborated: "To call such a spectacle a 'dramatic
composition' is an abuse of language, and an insult to the genius of the
English drama."" Although the judge denied that he was acting as a
conservator of public morality by denying copyright, he contradicted
himself by concluding, "it is the duty of all courts to uphold public virtue,
and [to] discourage and repel whatever tends to impair it.",6
Songs containing obscene lyrics were also ineligible for copyright
protection because they did not progress the arts as required by the
Intellectual Property Clause." A California court held that the song
"Dora Dean" was not useful (and, implicitly obscene) because it
contained the lyric "the hottest thing you ever seen" in reference to an
attractive woman."8 The court noted that "hot" could be defined as
51. McDavid, supra note 47, at 564; Stockdale v. Onwhyn (1826) io8 Eng. Rep. 65 (K.B.).
52. Stockdale, io8 Eng. Rep. at 66. The work in question was the Memoirs of Harriett Wilson, a
story of the exploits of a notorious courtesan. Kurt L. Schmalz, Problems in Giving Obscenity
Copyright Protection: Did Jartech and Mitchell Brothers Go Too Far?, 36 VAND. L. REv. 403, 404
(1983). In Stockdale, the court observed that English equity courts frequently refused to grant
injunctive relief to stop piracy of morally objectionable works. This equity-focused view was based on
the doctrine of unclean hands, which prevents an author tainted by the illegality of publishing an
obscene work from enjoying the protection of the court's authority. Id. at 405.
53. Martinetti v. Maguire, 16 F. Cas. 920 (C.C.D. Cal. 1867 (no. 9173)). The case concerned an
infringement action regarding the play "Black Crook," which the author slightly modified the characters
and dialog in creating "Black Rook." The court held that both plays lacked originality, and thus neither
was entitled to copyright protection. Id. at 922-23.
54. Id. at 922.
55- Id.
56. Id.
57. Broder v. Zeno Mauvais Music Co., 88 F. 74, 79 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1898).
58. Id.
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"lustful, lewd, or lecherous," and concluded that the obscene lyrics were
not copyrightable.59
Throughout the 1900s, however, courts began to erode the bar for
obscene works. In 1925, in a case that serves as an exemplar for changing
mores, a court echoed the morality requirement for copyright protection,
but failed to apply it.60 A district court in New York held that the play
White Cargo infringed upon the novel Hell's Playground, even though
the works were "unnecessarily coarse and highly sensual." 6' The novel
and the play both depicted an Englishman's affair with a West African
native in the French Congo. The court did not find the work in question
62immoral, but stated that copyright would have been invalid if it were.
The difficulty of applying morality to copyright was acknowledged
in litigation over the movie When Tomorrow Comes, a movie in which a
couple engaged in "indecent and vulgar" acts before a church altar.63
Interestingly, the court in this case did not apply the Martinetti rule to
invalidate the copyright. 64 Rather, the court applied the U.S. Post Office's
definition of obscenity that was used to keep pornography out of the
mail. This test considers the works as a whole and proscribes the work if
it has a "direct tendency to corrupt morals." 65 The court determined that
the work was not obscene because the woman who desecrated the altar
was killed at the end of the film, and thus cured the film of any possible
immorality.66
The last gasp of moral regulation in copyright occurred when the New
York Supreme Court refused to allow copyright on a plaintiff's satirical
strip-tease dance because it failed to promote the objectives of copyright.'
Although the decision was not based on moral outrage, as was the focus in
earlier decisions, the court denied copyright because the dance failed to
promote the progress of science and useful arts.68 The court reasoned:
"[N]ot everything [that is] put on the stage can be subject to copyright.
While plaintiff's performance was no doubt amusing and entertaining to
many, it does not fall within the purview of the statute as a production
tending to promote the progress of science and useful arts." 69
59. Id.
6o. Simontonv. Gordon, 12 F.2d ii6, 124 (S.D.N.Y. 1925).
61. Id.
62. Id.




67. Dane v. M. & H. Co., 1963 WL 8o6o, at *4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 25, 1963).
68. Id.
69. Id. ("Where a performance contains nothing of a literary, dramatic or musical character which
is calculated to elevate, cultivate, inform or improve the moral or intellectual natures of the audience,
it does not tend to promote the progress of science or the useful arts.").
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b. Modern Copyright Law Rejects Bars Based on Morality
Although neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has explicitly
weighed in, the modern view is to afford all eligible works copyright
protection, regardless of the (im)morality of the content.0 The Fifth and
Ninth Circuits have expressly held that obscene works are copyrightable,
reasoning that the need for national copyright protection outweighs the
state and federal public policies against obscenity." This is the approach
taken by the Copyright Office today.
In 1979, the Fifth Circuit held in Mitchell Brothers Film Group v.
Cinema Adult Theater that works could not be excluded from copyright
because of obscene content. In Mitchell Brothers, copyright owners of
the adult film Behind the Green Door brought an infringement suit
against a group of theater owners showing the film without permission.73
Defendants argued that the copyright holders brought suit with "unclean
hands," and that equity should uphold obscenity as an affirmative
defense to infringement." The Fifth Circuit did not agree, rejecting the
moral conservator theory of copyright invalidation," the property
interest theory,76 and the unclean hands equitable doctrine. The court
reasoned that Congress had intentionally omitted, and therefore did not
intend, a bar for immoral or obscene works.'8 The court further argued
that denying copyright to obscene works was contrary to the Intellectual
Property Clause's purpose of promoting creativity,7 9 and reasoned that
the market was the appropriate arbiter in determining if a work is fit for
70. See 1-2 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.17 (Mitchell expressly held "that a work is not excluded
from copyright protection by reason of its obscene content. This holding may be taken as the currently
prevailing view, although [in the past], a number of previous courts took the view that obscene works
are not eligible for copyright.").
71. Schmalz, supra note 53, at 417.
72. Mitchell Bros. Film Grp. v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852, 862 (5th Cir. 1979).
73. Id. at 854.
74. Id.
75. See id. at 861.
76. See id.
77. See id.
78. Id. at 854-55 ("We can only conclude that we must read the facially all-inclusive 1909
copyright statute as containing no explicit or implicit bar to the copyrighting of obscene materials, and
as therefore providing for the copyright of all creative works, obscene or non-obscene, that otherwise
meet the requirements of the Copyright Act."). Id. at 858.
79. Id. at 856 (reserving copyright for only moral works "would be antithetical to [the] promotion
of creativity. The pursuit of creativity requires freedom to explore into the gray areas, to the cutting
edge, and even beyond.") The court also cited books banned under obscenity laws as further evidence
of stifled creativity. Id. at 857. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Delacey, 171 N.E. 455 (Mass. 1930) (finding
Lady Chatterley's Lover by D.H. Lawrence obscene); Commonwealth v. Friede, 171 N.E. 472 (Mass.
1930) (finding An American Tragedy by Theodore Dreiser obscene); Besig v. United States, 208 F.2d
142(9th Cir. 1953) (finding Henry Miller's Tropic of Cancer and Tropic of Capricorn obscene).
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public consumption.so The Ninth Circuit followed the reasoning of the
Fifth Circuit in Jartech v. Clancy, a case decided three years after the
Mitchell Brothers decision and the first major copyright-morality case
under the Copyright Act of 1976.8' The issue of copyrightability of
obscene material has remained untouched at the appellate level since
Jartech.
Perhaps the most definitive evidence that modern copyright law
does not contain a morality bar is a simple search of issued U.S.
Copyrights via the Copyright Office's Internet database. The amount of
potentially obscene or scandalous material that has obtained copyright
protection is voluminous, and the copyright holders of pornographic and
"adult" material regularly engage with the Copyright Act to enforce their
exclusive rights under section lo6.83
2. Morality and Patent Law
The treatment of morality in patent law is parallel to that of
copyright law. Patents were once invalidated based on a theory of moral
utility, which is a theory that an invention designed for an immoral
purpose should not be patentable. This theory has not been used in many
years, a fact that has led scholars to characterize it as a relic of the past.
a. Historical Morality Bars in Patent Law
Utility patents were once subject to restrictions based on morality
like the ones that trademarks are subject to today. Patent law required
that "the invention should not be frivolous or injurious to the well-being,
good policy, or sound morals of society. The word 'useful,' therefore, is
incorporated into the act in contradistinction to mischievous or
8o. Mitchell Bros. Film Grp., 604 F.2d at 855 (stating copyright "is best served by allowing all
creative works... to be accorded copyright protection regardless of subject matter or content, trusting to
the public taste to reward creators of useful works and to deny creators of useless works any reward.").
8L. Jartech v. Clancy, 666 F.2d 403 (9th Cir. 1982). See Schmalz, supra note 53, at 416.
82. Search available at Public Catalog, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., http://cocatalog.loc.gov/cgi-bin/
Pwebrecon.cgi?DB=local&PAGE=First (last visited Nov. 7, 2016). For example, a search for "incest"
provided 221 unique registrations. Id.
83. Gabe Friedman, The Biggest Filer of Copyright Lawsuits? This Erotica Web Site, NEW YORKER (May
14, 2014), http://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/the-biggest-filer-of-copyright-lawsuits-this-erotica-
web-site; Tony Pipitone & Sandra Esquivel, Porn Company Sues Thousands Claiming Copyright
Infringement, NBC MIAMI (May 4, 2014), http/www.nbcmiami.com/news/local/Porn-Company-Sues-
Thousands-Claiming-Copyright-Infringement-257869461.html; Claire Sudath, Prenda Law, the Porn
Copyright Trolls, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (May 30, 2013, 1:51 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2o3-o5-3o/prenda-law-the-porn-copyright-trolls; Kashmir Hill, How Porn Copyright Lawyer
John Steele Has Made a 'Few Million Dollars' Pursuing (Sometimes Innocent) 'Porn Pirates,' FORBES (Oct. 15,




immoral."' Under this definition, "immoral" or "mischievous"
inventions were not patentable because those uses were not beneficial to
society. Justice Story cited inventions designed to poison people,
promote debauchery, or facilitate private assassination as examples of
immoral inventions that did not perpetuate the public good.8
This moral utility requirement was typically applied in two distinct
situations: one in which the public was likely to be deceived, and the
other where the invention would enable immoral behavior. Courts
invalidated patents based on artifice, where a process for treating plain
leaf tobacco plants made their leaves spotted, because cigar smokers
believed that spotted tobacco leaves were of better quality, which
enabled the inventor to sell counterfeit tobacco for a higher price.86 The
court denied patent protection because the invention did not improve the
tobacco leaf or the cigar smoking process, and because its sole purpose
was to deceive the public.' Similarly, in Scott & Williams, Inc. v. Aristo
Hosiery Co., the Second Circuit denied patent protection for a seamless
stocking that featured an imitation seam on one side.88 The prevailing
thought of the time was that seamed stockings were of higher quality.89
Again, the court denied patent protection because its design was
deceptive.9 0 This invention was useful in a particular way-that is, it
allowed people who were unable to purchase seamed stockings to obtain
the appearance of the expensive alternative. However, the court focused
on the underlying artifice and refused registration.9'
By the time the Federal Circuit rejected the immorality and mischief
bars in 1999, they had already become somewhat of a relic, and courts
rarely implicated the moral utility theory at all. 92 In the landmark case
Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., the patent in question created the
illusion that liquid was being dispensed from a container above a spout
when it was really pumped from a container hidden below the counter. 93
When Juicy Whip sued a competitor for infringement, the competitor
claimed that the patent was invalid because it lacked utility due to its
84. Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. ioi8, 1019 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 8568); see also Llewellyn
Joseph Gibbons, Semiotics of the Scandalous and the Immoral and the Disparaging: Section 2(A)
Trademark Law After Lawrence v. Texas, 9 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 187, 205 n.88 (2005).
85. Lowell, 15 F. Cas. at 1019.
86. Rickard v. Du Bon, 103 F. 868, 869 (2d Cir. 1900).
87. Id. at 872-73.




92. Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F-3 d 1364, 1366-67 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ("[B]ut the
principle that inventions are invalid if they are principally designed to serve immoral or illegal
purposes has not been applied broadly in recent years.").
93. Id. at 1365; U.S. Patent No. 5,575,405 (filed Apr. 18, 1996).
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deceptiveness.94 The district court found the patent invalid because its
purpose was to increase sales by deception, but the Second Circuit
reversed.95 The court reasoned that "[t]he fact that one product can be
altered to make it look like another is in itself a specific benefit sufficient
to satisfy the statutory requirement of utility."9 6 The court subsequently
described several issued patents that had utility because they were
designed to represent something that they were not."
Patents were once invalid if they enabled an immoral behavior, but
courts no longer do so based on the theory that the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office ("USPTO") should not be the arbiter of morality. The
evolution of disregarding morality as a basis for patentability is well
illustrated in the context of gambling. In 1889, devices related to
gambling were found to lack utility, and thus were unpatentable.98
However, an invention solely used for gambling was granted a patent in
1977-99 In Ex parte Murphy, the Board stated that the USPTO "should
not be the agency which seeks to enforce a standard of morality with
respect to gambling, by refusing, on the ground of lack of patentable
utility, to grant a patent."0 0 Since that time, no court has relied on the
moral utility doctrine in rejecting a patent. 10
We can see a similar evolution away from morality in other areas of
patent law as well. A patent for a novelty "keyhole finder" was invalidated
by the U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals ("CCPA") in the 1950s
when it was discovered that the device gave the appearance of female
genitalia.0 2 However, patents have been granted in recent decades on
countless sexually explicit inventions including: an oral prophylactic, 3 a
contraceptive and flavor delivery system,' a unisex condom,o' interactive
94. Juicy Whip, Inc., 185 F.3 d at 1366.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1367.
97. Id.; see, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 5,762,968 (filed Mar. 12, 1996) (method for producing imitation grill
marks on food without using heat); U.S. Patent No. 5,899,038 (Apr. 22, 1997) (laminated flooring
imitating wood); U.S. Patent No. 5,571,545 (Jan. 23, 1996) (imitation hamburger). The court also referred
to cubic zirconium, imitation gold leaf, and imitation leather. Juicy Whip, Inc., 185 F.3 d at 1367.
98. Nat'l Automatic Device Co. v. Lloyd, 40 F. 89, 89-90 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1889).
99. Exparte Murphy, 2oo U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 8oi, 802-03 (T.T.A.B. 1977).
1oo. Id. at 803. "[W]hile some may consider gambling to be injurious to the public morals and
thegood order of society, we cannot find any basis in 35 U.S.C. ioi or related sections which justify a
conclusion that inventions which are useful only for gambling ipso facto are void of patentable utility."
Id. at 802.
ioi. Cynthia M. Ho, Splicing Morality and Patent Law: Issues Arising from Mixing Mice and Men,
2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 247, 249 (2000).
IO2. U.S. Patent No. 2,632,266 (filed May 2, 1950).
103. U.S. Patent No. 4,949,731 (filed Aug. 27, 1987) (claiming both oral contraception and
protection from paint entering the mouth when painting with the mouth).
104. U.S. Patent No. 4,919,149 (filed July 8, 1988).
105. U.S. Patent No. 4,966,165 (filed Aug. 12, 1988).
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lingerie, o6 a female garment with enfolding labia majora," couples
intimacy reciprocating and pivoting two seat assembly,ios a method and
device for interactive virtual control of sexual aids using digital computer
networks, 9 and a penis pump."'
b. Modern Patent Law Avoids the Moral Utility Theory
as a Basis for Rejection of Patent Rights
In recent years, the USPTO has had the opportunity to revisit the
moral utility theory, but has chosen not to do so as a basis for rejection of
patent rights. The filing of patent applications for life-related patents raised
the question of morality as a basis for determining patentable subject matter
when cellular biologist Stewart Newman attempted to obtain a method
patent for producing a half human, half animal species."' Newman's
application was not filed to acquire a patent on his invention, but was rather
a de facto petition to the USPTO to clarify its stance on the patentability of
life." 2 When Newman's application was publicized, the USPTO reacted
quickly with an advisory stating that all patent applications must meet strict
patentability requirements and the USPTO does not discriminate against
fields of technology."3 It also stated that "courts have interpreted the utility
requirement to exclude inventions that are deemed to be 'injurious to the
well being, good policy, or good morals of society.'""' While this raised the
spectre of resurrection of the moral utility theory, the USPTO did not use it
as a basis for rejecting the Newman's application. Instead, the USPTO
rejected the patent on the basis that it failed to claim statutory subject
matter."' The USPTO has more recently acknowledged that with regard to
Lo6. U.S. Patent No. 5,086,519 (filed Feb. 7, 1991).
107. U.S. Patent No. 5,285,531 (filed Sept. 4, 1992).
io8. U.S. Patent No. 5,385,154 (filed Nov. 4, 1993).
1o9. U.S. Patent No. 6,368,268 Bi (filed Aug. 17, 1998).
110. U.S. Patent No. 7,651,463 B2 (filed Sept. 2, 2005). Note that some of these were issued much
earlier than 1999, further suggesting that the requirement was not uniformly implemented before
being formally rejected. For a more in-depth look at sexual inventions, see generally HOAG LEVINS,
AMERICAN SEX MACHINES: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF SEX AT THE U.S. PATENT OFFICE (1996). Also note
that some of the patents would more readily offend some than others, and that some would probably
have been more offensive earlier in history than they are now.
III. See Group Faults PTO for Issuing Patent on 'Method of Producing Cloned Mammal,' 64 PAT.
TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 81 (2002); Benjamin D. Enerson, Note, Protecting Society from Patently
Offensive Inventions: The Risk of Reviving the Moral Utility Doctrine, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 685, 693 (2004).
II2. Se~n M. Coughlin, The Newman Application and the USPTO's Unnecessary Response:
Patentability of Humans and Human Embryos, 5 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 90, 90 (2oo6). Newman is
generally against patenting life, and sought to "spur debate about the ethics of genetic engineering and
patenting life forms." Id. at 92.
113. Press Release, U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Facts on Patenting Life Forms Having a
Relationship to Humans (Apr. i, 1998), http:// www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/speeches/98-o6.htm.
114. Id. (citing Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. o18 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 8568)).
115. See id.; U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., Vol. 1077 (No. 3), OFF. GAZ. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFFICE
8 (1987) ("A claim directed to or including within its scope a human being will not be considered to be
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DNA sequences it is without authority to deny a patent based on morality.
The USPTO has stated:
The scope of subject matter that is eligible for a patent, the requirements
that must be met in order to be granted a patent, and the legal rights that
are conveyed by an issued patent, are all controlled by statutes which the
USPTO must administer.... Congress creates the law and the Federal
judiciary interprets the law. The USPTO must administer the laws as
Congress has enacted them and as the Federal courts have interpreted
them. Current law provides that when the statutory patentability
requirements are met, there is no basis to deny patent applications .. 6
c. Design Patents Retain a Morality Bar but It Is
Infrequently Applied in Practice
U.S. law provides modified patent protection for inventions of "new,
original and ornamental design for an article of manufacture . .. ."'" Unlike
utility patents, design patents are barred for subject matter that could be
offensive to any race, religion, sex, ethnic group, or nationality."8 However,
this bar is infrequently used. While rejections of design patent applications
are not published, and no statistics on design patent rejections are publicly
available from the USPTO, it is at least some indication that there are no
appeals on record for rejections on this basis."9 In addition, there are many
examples of existing design patents for material that may reasonably be
found offensive to a race, religion, sex, ethnic group, or nationality:
* Bottle with frontal female nudityo20
* Buddha golf head cover'2'
* A.R. Conner Flag (flag depicting an African-American caricature,
along with a watermelon, a chicken, and a rat) 22
* Pasta box depicting the Last Supper 23
patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. [§] loi."). Enerson, supra note 113, at 693; U.S. Patent &
Trademark Office, Non-final Office Action Summary of App. No. 08/993,56, at 17 (Oct. 7, 2003)
(presenting a new standard: Claims embracing humans and human embryos are not patentable).
116. Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1095 (Jan. 5, 2001). The Utility
Examination Guidelines are instructions to be used by USPTO examiners when assessing the
patentability of a claimed invention.
117. 35 U.S.C. § 171 (2012).
118. See U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., MPEP § 1504.01(e) (8th ed. Rev. 7, July 2008).
119. In addition, correspondence with USPTO Patent Attorney David Gerk, who specializes in
design patent applications, supports this conclusion. Regarding rejection of design patents for
offensiveness, he states: "[T]his is not something I understand comes up frequently." E-mail from
David Gerk, Patent Attorney, Office of Policy & Int'l Affairs, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, to
Megan Carpenter, Professor of Law, Tex. A&M Univ. Sch. of Law, and Author of this Article (Feb. 3,
2015, 8:40 AM) (on file with author).
I2o. U.S. Patent No. D 7 21,97 4 S (filed June 28, 2013) (issued Feb. 3, 2015).
121. U.S. Patent No. D465,82I S (filed Dec. 4,2001) (issued Nov. 19, 2002).
122. U.S. Patent No. D3 5,985 (filed June 9, 1902) (issued Aug. 5, 1902) (flag picturing an African-
American caricature along with a watermelon, chicken, and a rat).
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B. LIKE OTHER FORMS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRADEMARKS SHOULD
MOVE AWAY FROM CONDITIONING PROTECTION ON MORALITY
While trademark rights are distinct in certain ways from other forms
of intellectual property, trademarks are part of the body of intellectual
property law, and the development of copyright and patent law can be
insightful.24 Intellectual property law generally provided a starting point
for consideration of the vesting of trademark rights and the
interpretation of trademark doctrine, including registration of marks and
federal legislation.'25  While there was some resistance to bringing
trademarks within the umbrella of intellectual property law, trademarks
are now categorically considered to be a form of human creativity that
may be treated as an asset. Central to the initial resistance was the claim
that trademarks were not a form of property, but rather a device to
prevent forgery or fraud: "[I]t should be remembered that there was this
important difference between patents and trade marks, that copying or
infringing the latter was really analogous to forgery, while the
infringement of a patent was merely interfering with a private right of
property.",26 Trademarks are now commonly considered a form of
intellectual property right, even if that right is an instrumental one, as
described in Hanover Star Milling Co.,"' and United Drug v. Theodore
Rectanus.12 In evaluating priority and territorial limitations of the
individual uses, the Court in Hanover treated the trademark at issue as a
property right to the extent that it served as an instrumentality to a trade
reputation and the goodwill that flows from that. The Court stated that
the property interest in a trademark exists, but is limited to that
"appurtenant to an established business or trade in connection with
which the mark is used."1 29 The property interest, thus, inheres in
connection with the goodwill of an existing business, and a trademark's
ability to signify that source. 30
123. U.S. Patent No. D627 ,661 S (filed Jan. 4, 2010) (box of pasta depicting the Last Supper on the
box). Although the scene appears to be accurately depicted, the existence of the Last Supper on a
pasta box may offend someone, and copyright protection might be more appropriate.
124. See Diamond, supra note Lo, at 288; Paster, supra note 13, at 566; Rudolf Callmann, Unfair
Competition Without Competition? The Importance of the Property Concept in the Law of Trade-
Marks, 95 U. PA. L. REV. 443, 454-57 (1947); see also In re Trade-Mark Cases, Loo U.S. 82 (1879);
Millington v. Fox (1838) 40 Eng. Rep. 956.
125. BRAD SHERMAN & LIONEL BENTLY, THE MAKING OF MODERN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW L68-
69 (1999).
126. Id. at 172.
127. Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 411 (1916) In Hanover Star Milling Co.,
three entities all had separate claims to the mark TEA ROSE as applied to flour. Id.
128. United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus CO., 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918).
129. Hanover Star Milling CO., 240 U.S. at 414.
130. United Drug CO., 248 U.S. at 97. This case also focused on the territorial scope of trademark
protection, and supports this view of trademarks as an instrumentality, stating that the notion of a
trademark as a right in gross or at large is a "fundamental error." Id. Trademarks are, rather, a "means
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Trademarks are one of the main forms of intellectual property,
therefore it is worth considering the development of the other forms of
intellectual property when advancing its development. Like trademark
law, copyright and patent law once conditioned acquisition or
maintenance of rights on its subjects' morality. As previously discussed,
copyright was denied to offensive works because those types of works
failed to promote the progress of science and the useful arts. Patent
rights were once conditioned on the moral utility of an invention.
However, both forms of intellectual property have moved away from
using morality as a basis on which to deny protection, because doing so
would be outside the core functions of those bodies of law. Because
regulating morality is also outside the core function of trademark law, it
should also remove these bars.
C. THE MORALITY BAR FOR SCANDALOUS AND IMMORAL MARKS
MAY BE UNCONSTITUTIONAL
As discussed previously, removing the 2(a) bar for registration of
scandalous and immoral trademarks would be in line with the function
and purpose of trademark law, and with other forms of intellectual
property. In addition, the Federal Circuit has held that a bar on
registration of scandalous and immoral trademarks is unconstitutional as
a content-based restriction on speech-it denies certain benefits to
scandalous and disparaging speech that it provides to non-scandalous
and non-disparaging speech. 3 ' As a content-based restriction of private
speech, the bar is presumptively invalid and subject to strict
scrutiny-the focus of the government action is on the expressive, not
commercial, functions of the particular speech involved. To overcome
this presumption of invalidity, a restriction must be narrowly tailored to
serve a compelling state interest.3 2 If scandalous marks rise to the level
for facilitating the protection of one's good-will in trade," and the accompanying rights grow out of the
use of a mark, not the adoption of it. Id. at 98. The Court grounded trademark law in the law of unfair
competition. Id. at 97. The Lanham Act, the comprehensive federal trademark act which came into
force in 1947, supports this perspective and provides the core of trademark law even today. The
Lanham Act was principally drafted by Edward S. Rogers of Chicago, and introduced into Congress
by Texas Congressman Fritz Lanham. Edward S. Rogers, The Lanham Act and the Social Function of
Trade-Marks, 14 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. I73, I8o (1949) (arguing that the purpose of the Lanham Act
was to protect trade-marks and to repress unfair competition, as well as to encourage the use of trade-
marks and thus recognize their social value) (citing Edward S. Rogers, Introduction to DAPHNE
ROBERT, THE NEW TRADE-MARK MANUAL: A HANDBOOK ON PROTECTION OF TRADE-MARKS IN
INTERSTATE COMMERCE XiV (1947)).
131. In re Tam, 8o8 F.3 d 1321, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (stating that this provision in the Lanham Act
serves as a content-based restriction on speech).
132. The Federal Circuit recently held in In re Tam that the bar on registration of disparaging
marks does not serve a compelling state interest, given the viewpoint-based nature of the restriction.
The registration bar for scandalous marks would not constitute viewpoint-based discrimination,
however, because it does not value one perspective over another. Id.
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of obscenity, the government would have sufficient interest in restricting
them and would be able to overcome the presumption. However, if
scandalous marks only rise to a lesser standard, such as vulgarity or
offensiveness, the registration bar would be more likely to be
unconstitutional.
The Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure ("TMEP"), case
law, and empirical research all indicate that the standard for
scandalousness is below the obscenity standard. The TMEP states:
"[T]he threshold is lower for what can be described as 'scandalous' than
for 'obscene."' 33 Under current case law, a mark is scandalous if multiple
dictionaries indicate a proposed mark is vulgar and the applicant's use is
limited to the vulgar meaning.'34 Vulgarity and offensiveness, in fact, are
used as the standard in the majority of rejections based on
scandalousness.'35 My research has found that dictionary definitions
noting that a word is "vulgar" or "offensive" were used as a primary
source of support for a rejection based on scandalousness ninety-one
percent of the time, and that examiners used only the dictionary in
seventy percent of such refusals.3 6 Thus, their regulation is unlikely to
rise to the level of a compelling state interest.
Courts have long assumed that the 2(a) registration bar is
constitutional based on In re McGinley,'3 7 a 1981 case that held without
much analysis that the registration bar did not violate the First
Amendment because "no conduct is proscribed, and no tangible form of
expression is suppressed." Courts have only recently analyzed the issue,
and the Federal Circuit in In re Tam recently considered the
constitutionality of the 2(a) bar for disparaging marks at length. The
court held that the bar was subject to, and could not withstand, strict
scrutiny. In light of this opinion, arguments for the constitutionality of
133. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, TMEP § 1203.01 (Apr. 2016). However, the TMEP states:
"Refusal to register immoral or scandalous matter has been found not to abridge First Amendment
rights, because no conduct is proscribed and no tangible form of expression is suppressed. Also, the
term 'scandalous' has been held sufficiently precise to satisfy due process requirements under the Fifth
Amendment." See In re McGinley, 66o F.2d 481, 484-85 (C.C.P.A. 1981).
134. TMEP § I2O3.OI (citing In re Boulevard Entm't, 334 F-3 d 1336, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (holding I-
8oo-JACK-OFF and JACK OFF scandalous, "where all dictionary definitions of 'jack-off' were
considered vulgar")); Bos. Red Sox Baseball Club Ltd. P'ship v. Sherman, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d 1581 (T.T.A.B.
2oo8) (basing scandalousness of SEX ROD mark on dictionary definitions designating the term "ROD"
as being vulgar, and applicant's admission that SEX ROD had a sexual connotation); In re Red Bull
GmbH, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d 1375, 1381-82 (T.T.A.B. 2oo6) (finding BULLSHIT scandalous because dictionary
definitions indicate it is "obscene," "vulgar," "usually vulgar," "vulgar slang," or "rude slang," which
"constitutes a prima facie showing that the term" is "offensive to the conscience of a substantial
composite of the general public"). See Carpenter & Garner, supra note I, for a comprehensive discussion
of the evidence used to reject marks for scandalousness.
135. See generally all sources cited, supra note 134.
136. Carpenter & Garner, supra note I, at 336-37.
137. In re McGinley, 66o F.2d at 484.
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the registration bar for scandalous marks may be unpersuasive.38 For
example, some argue that this provision of the Lanham Act regulates
commercial speech, and is therefore not subject to strict scrutiny.'39
However, In re Tam found that with regard to disparaging marks, the
mark's expressive nature subjects it to rejection. 40 This is also true for
scandalous marks. A mark's scandalous nature is not part of its source-
identifying function any more than a disparaging mark would be. Like
disparaging marks, the expressive component is precisely the
prohibition's target."'
The argument that the registration bar is constitutional because
registration is government speech is similarly unpersuasive. The Federal
Circuit affirmed that trademark registration is not government speech
because it is merely a regulatory activity, like registration of copyright.'42
Finally, the constitutionality of 2(a) may not be salvaged on the basis that
trademark owners can still use a mark. A trademark owner receives
substantial benefits from trademark registration, and denial of those
benefits creates a chilling effect on use of those types of marks. 43
Furthermore, there is uncertainty regarding the enforceability under
section 43(a) of the Lanham Act of marks that have been refused
registration based on policy reasons. 44 In addition, the Model State
Trademark Act keeps 2(a) intact and prevents trademark owners from
registering scandalous marks under state law. 45
III. CONTEXTUAL HEALING
As discussed above, removing the registration bar would be in line
with the core function of trademark law, other forms of intellectual
property, and fundamental constitutional principles. However, on a
practical level, Congress and the courts may be unlikely to displace the
Lanham Act's morality bar.
138. See generally In re Tam, 8o8 F.3 d 1321 (2016).
139. If trademark registration is commercial speech, the standard would be evaluated on a basis of
intermediate scrutiny. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 571-72 (1980).
140. In re Tam, 8o8 F.3 d at 1337-38.
141. See id. at 1338.
142. Id. at 1345-46 (holding that the ® does not convert trademark into government speech any
more than a © converts a copyrighted work into government speech).
143. See id. at 1342.
144. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992) ("[I]t is common ground
that § 43(a) protects qualifying unregistered trademarks and that the general principles qualifying a
mark for registration under § 2 of the Lanham Act are for the most part applicable in determining
whether an unregistered mark is entitled to protection under § 43(a)."); see Renna v. County of Union,
N.J., 88 F. Supp. 3 d 310 (D.N.J. 2014) (holding that a mark denied registration based on policy
grounds is not enforceable under 43(a)).
145. MODEL STATE TRADEMARK BILL (Int'l Trademark Ass'n 1992); In re Tam, 8o8 F.3 d at 1343-44.
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A. THE MORALITY BAR WOULD BE MORE EFFECTIVELY APPLIED
IF TRADEMARK EXAMINERS CONSIDERED CONTEXTUAL FACTORS
IN THEIR ANALYSIS
We should interpret and apply existing law in an effective and fair
way that is in harmony with the body of trademark law. However, as
currently applied, the registration bar is ineffective and vague. Both
trademark examiners and applicants need clearer guidance in this area.
One way to effectuate trademark policy is to ensure that trademark
examiners consider context when evaluating marks that may be scandalous
or immoral. When evaluating the eligibility of marks for registration
generally, trademark law often considers subject marks in context. While
scandalous marks are also in principle to be evaluated in the context of the
marketplace, trademark examiners do not typically consider contextual
factors. Considering contextual factors while determining scandalousness
would lead to a more effective and fair result throughout the application
process.
As previous research has acknowledged, application of this
provision of the Lanham Act is inconsistent at best and nonsensical at
worst." 6 Despite the fact that scandalousness is supposed to be
determined according to the context of contemporary attitudes and the
relevant marketplace for goods and services identified in the
application,' context is not considered with regard to targeted
consumers, goods and services, or the marketplace. Marks are often
rejected on the basis of a dictionary definition without consideration of
contextual factors. Despite the lack of meaningful analysis, marks
containing the same terms on similar goods and services may end up both
rejected and approved without additional explanation. Whether a mark
is rejected or registered often depends on the particular trademark
examiner, and responses to office actions are rarely if ever successful,
because in the absence of relevant analysis, there is nothing to argue
against." 8 Furthermore, the standards for scandalousness and immorality
are unclear: To the extent that there are standards, they are often
erroneously conflated with disparagement. Requiring consideration of
context will also provide trademark applicants and examiners with
clearer guidance throughout the registration process.
146. Carpenter & Murphy, supra note i; Carpenter & Garner, supra note i.
147. In re Mavety Media Grp. Ltd., 33 F-3 d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 1994); In re McGinley, 66o F.2d
481, 484-85 (C.C.P.A. 1981).
148. See Carpenter & Garner, supra note i.
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i. The Determination of Scandalousness Should Be Made in
the Context of the Relevant Marketplace
A mark must be evaluated in the context of contemporary attitudes,
and the determination of whether a mark is scandalous should be made
in the context of the relevant marketplace for the goods or services
identified in the application.'49 This is ascertained from the standpoint of
not necessarily a majority, but a substantial composite of the general
public.' To support a refusal on these grounds, an examiner must
provide evidence that a substantial portion of the general public would
consider the mark scandalous in the context of contemporary attitudes
and the relevant marketplace.'"' Thus, a determination that a mark is
scandalous because it is used in a scandalous marketplace is a
misapplication of the law. Rejecting a mark on the basis that mark's use
on sexually explicit goods reinforces the vulgarity of its intended
meaning is not just circular reasoning, but is incorrect. It creates a
situation where a mark on a good sold in a specific marketplace cannot
be registered, even though the good may not be considered scandalous in
the context of that specific marketplace. Further, even though that
marketplace may not be frequented by or accessible to the general
public, the mark still may not be registered if the general public could
find the term abstractly vulgar. The proper inquiry, however, is not an
abstract one-it is whether a substantial composite of the general public
would find the mark scandalous for the particular marketplace. Yet,
context of any sort was considered in fewer than half of refusals based on
scandalousness or immorality. 2
At the same time, "scandalous" has been held to encompass matter
that is merely "vulgar."'53 Evidence of the opinions of a substantial
composite of the general public can include magazine articles, newspaper
articles, and dictionary definitions.' Accordingly, the Federal Circuit has
held that dictionary definitions alone can be sufficient to establish
scandalousness where multiple dictionaries indicate a word is vulgar and
the applicant's mark indicates the vulgar meaning of the word.'"' What
this means in practical terms is that, in the majority of rejections, a
149. In re Mavety Media Grp. Ltd., 33 F.3 d at 1371. In re McGinley, 66o F.2d at 485; In re Wilcher
Corp., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1929 (T.T.A.B. 1996); Greyhound Corp. v. Both Worlds, Inc., 6 U.S.P.Q.2d 1635,
1639 (T.T.A.B. 1988); U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, TMEP § 1203.01 (Apr. 2016).
150. In re Mavety Media Grp. Ltd., 33 F.3d at 1369.
151. In re Mavety Media Grp., 33 F.3 d at 1371-72.
152. See Carpenter & Garner, supra note I, at 334-35.
153. Vulgar has been defined as "lacking in taste, indelicate, morally crude." U.S. PATENT &
TRADEMARK OFFICE, TMEP § I2O3.OI (citing In re Runsdorf, 171 U.S.P.Q- 443, 444 (T.T.A.B. 1971)).
154. TMEP § 120301.
155. The applicant's use must be limited to the vulgar meaning of the word. In re Boulevard
Entm't, Inc., 334 F-3 d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (finding the marks i-800-JACK-OFF and JACK OFF
were scandalous where multiple dictionary definitions indicated the term "jack off" was vulgar).
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dictionary definition indicating a word is offensive or vulgar is the only
evidence used to reject the mark.
The lack of clear standards causes problems for USPTO examiners
who are under pressure to process applications quickly and efficiently.
When considering whether a particular mark is scandalous, an examining
attorney can either ascertain the meaning of a mark in the context of the
current attitudes of the day or perform a quick dictionary search and
reject an application if the particular term is "vulgar." According to the
USPTO Performance Appraisal Plan, a trademark examiner must meet
quarterly quotas. To be considered "fully successful," examiners must
complete 425 to 549 balanced disposals1 6 of applications per quarter.57
To be "outstanding," an examiner should have completed at least 515 to
575 balanced disposals.58 If trademark examiners average 500 working
hours per quarter, an "outstanding" trademark examiner must process
more than one application per hour. Unsurprisingly, the examiners in the
majority of applications refused on the basis of scandalousness fail to
consider the context of the marketplace or the goods and services listed
in the application.
2. Trademark Examiners Typically Do Not Consider Contextual
Factors in a Refusal Based on Scandalousness, Regardless of
the Marketplace or Goods at Issue
Trademark examiners are highly unlikely to consider contextual
factors in a refusal based on the scandalous or immoral nature of a mark.
Refusals frequently mention the relevance of context de jure but
disregard it de facto.' 59 The vast majority of applications that are rejected
156. A Balanced Disposal means that either a first Office Action has issued, the application has been
approved for publication after examination, or the application has been abandoned. See, e.g., U.S. PATENT
& TRADEMARK OFFICE, TRADEMARK PUBLIC ADVISORY COMMITTEE ANNUAL REPORT 5 (2014), https://www.
uspto.gov/about/advisory/tpac/TPACAnnualReport20I4.pdf.
157. Performance Plan, Progress Review and Appraisal Record (GS-9, GS-ii, and GS-12), NAT'L
TREASURY EMPS. UNION, http://www.nteu245.org/memos-docs/PAPs/GS-9-II-I2PAP.PDF (last visited Nov.
7, 2016) [hereinafter Performance Plan (GS-9, GS-ii, and GS-12)]; Performance Plan, Progress Review and
Appraisal Record (GS-i3 and GS-i4), NAT'L TREASURY EMPS. UNION, http/www.nteu245.org/memos-
docs/PAPs/PAPI3-14.pdf (last visited Nov. 7, 2016) [hereinafter Performance Plan (GS-i3 and GS-i4)]; see
also Memorandum of Understanding Between the Nat'l Treasury Emps. Union Chapter 245 & the U.S.
Patent & Trademark Office Regarding Implementation of a Pilot Award for Comprehensive Excellence
(ACE Award) (Mar. 18, 20o), http://Iloioi.com/ACEMOU.pdf.
158. Performance Plan (GS-9, GS-ii, and GS-12), supra note 157; Performance Plan (GS-i 3 and
GS-i 4 ), supra note 157.
159. For various example, see Carpenter & Garner, supra note I, at 344-45.
This frequently occurred with regard to [refusals based on words typically considered] profan[e].
In a significant number of rejections, examiners (I) cited the rule that trademarks must be
evaluated in the context of current attitudes; (2) noted that profanity was more common in
current society; and then (3) concluded that acceptance of profanity makes words no less profane.
The examiner then rejected the marks without any additional supporting evidence.
Id. at 344.
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on the basis of scandalousness are rejected because they are listed as
"vulgar" in the dictionary."6 My previous research indicated that dictionary
definitions were used as a primary source of support for a rejection based on
scandalousness ninety-one percent of the time.16, Seventy percent of
rejections exclusively used the dictionary for support.162
The use of dictionary definitions as exclusive or primary evidence
for a refusal based on scandalousness is consistent across various
marketplaces, including niche markets such as adult entertainment.63 For
adult-oriented markets, dictionary definitions served as the only basis for
rejection in the majority of refusals. 64 When examiners did consider
contextual information in these niche markets, they only did so as an
argument against registration. That is, use of a mark in an adult-oriented
marketplace was used as further evidence of the mark's scandalous nature.6 5
For example, an examiner rejected the mark POST-TITS because the
general public would find it scandalous, despite the trademark owner's
assertion that the relevant market was controlled and narrow.166 This is often
the case when the application contains a reference to adult material." Most
16o. Id. at 336-37.
161. Id. at 337.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 338. In marks targeting an adult marketplace, only five Office Actions referenced
context of the marketplace at all. Id. at 338 n.75.
164. Id. at 338.
165. See, e.g., U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 76/484,466 (filed Jan. 22, 2003) (TOKYO
CREAMPIE) (Third Office Action dated Aug. 15, 2003); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No.
78/788,383 (filed Jan. io, 2oo6) (GAYFACIALSXXX) (Office Action dated July 15, 2oo6).
166. U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 76/536,775 (filed July 22, 2003) (Office Action dated
May 20, 2004).
167. See Carpenter & Garner, supra note i, at 339 (citing e.g., U.S. Trademark Application Serial
No. 78/853,993 (filed Apr. 4, 2oo6) (TITTY CITY) (claiming services in class 41 for "entertainment");
U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 85/253,332 (filed Feb. 28, 20II) (FAT COCK BEER); U.S.
Trademark Application Serial No. 76/484,466 (filed Jan. 22, 2003) (TOKYO CREAMPIE); U.S.
Trademark Application Serial No. 76/490,572 (filed Feb. 19, 2003) (JAPANESE CREAMPIE); U.S.
Trademark Application Serial No. 76/639,548 (filed May 25, 2005) (NIGGA); U.S. Trademark
Application Serial No. 77/281,745 (filed Sept. 18, 2007) (THIZZ JUICE); U.S. Trademark Application
Serial No. 76/675,279 (filed Apr. IO, 2007) (TITTIGYM); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No.
77/600,723 (filed Oct. 26, 2oo8) (COCAINE ENERGY); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No.
85/264,154 (filed Mar. ii, 20II) (SOCK MY COCK); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No.
78/829,207 (filed Mar. 3, 2oo6) (COCAINE); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 77/118,639 (filed
Feb. 28, 2007) (COCAINE CUT THE LEGAL ALTERNATIVE); U.S. Trademark Application
Serial No. 77/119,448 (filed Mar. I, 2007) (COCAINE FREE THE LEGAL ALTERNATIVE); U.S.
Trademark Application Serial No. 78/750,399 (filed Nov. 9, 2005) (METH); U.S. Trademark
Application Serial No. 76/536,775 (filed July 22, 2003) (POST-TITS); U.S. Trademark Application
Serial No. 78/558,043 (filed Feb. I, 2005) (HEEB); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78/904,458
(filed June 9, 2oo6) (BONER BATS ROCK HARD WOOD); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No.
78/682,282 (filed July 31, 2005) (YOU CUM LIKE A GIRL); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No.
78/631,791 (filed May 17, 2005) (MY SH!T D*N'T STINK); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No.
77/600,222 (filed Oct. 24, 2oo8) (SHAKE THOSE TITTIES); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No.
78/078,534 (filed Aug. 9, 2001) (SHITBEGONE); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78/716,443
(filed Sept. 20, 2005) (TALKING COCK)).
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often trademark examiners consider whether a substantial composite of
the general public would find the mark scandalous without considering
the market at issue. 68Google searches are common contextual evidence
used to demonstrate a mark is scandalous.169
Examiners are also unlikely to consider the context of goods and
services in rejections of scandalous marks. Like the above findings
regarding the marketplace, examiners are unlikely to consider the
context of goods and services identified in the application. Use of a mark
on adult-oriented goods is often used as evidence of the fact that a mark
is scandalous."' Use of a mark that may be vulgar on goods sold to the
general public is also used as evidence that a mark is scandalous."'
A lack of clarity in the guidelines for refusals based on scandalousness
sometimes leads to bizarre results. In at least one instance, an examiner
refused registration of a mark in part because scandalous information
would be found while searching for the stated vulgar terms, rather than
because the mark would be found while searching for more innocent
things. That examiner also mentioned that the relevant audience is
irrelevant to an analysis of whether a mark is scandalous or immoral
because that would help people attempting to register such marks. 73 The
examiner reasoned that if the appropriate test were the "relevant
population," no mark would ever be refused on 2(a) grounds "since the
applicant would not adopt a mark which would drive the relevant
168. Id. at 340-41.
169. For example, an examiner rejected the mark FAT COCK BEER in part based on the results
of a Google search indicating that "fat cock" is vulgar slang, concluding the mark was therefore
scandalous to the general public. U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 85/253,332 (filed Feb. 28,
20II). TITTY PRETTIES was similarly rejected in part because of a Google search showing that the
word "titty" can be used in an "offensive and disgraceful manner." U.S. Trademark Application Serial
No. 78/524,781 (filed Nov. 30, 2004) (Office Action dated July II, 2005).
170. For a list of examples, see Carpenter & Garner, supra note i, at 342-43.
171. U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78/879,965 (filed May 9, 2oo6) (rejecting TIT-MITT
on the basis that its use on bras would ensure people would know that "tit" was used to reference a
breast); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78/631,791 (filed May 17, 2005) (rejecting MY SH!T
D*N'T STINK because "shit" rendered the mark scandalous even if the term is relevant and not being
used in the vulgar sense); see also U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 77/883,100 (filed Dec. i,
2009) (TOUCH YOUR TITS for shirts); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 76/675,279 (filed
Apr. io, 2007) (TITTIGYM for an adult health and fitness club); U.S. Trademark Application Serial
No. 77/866,123 (filed Nov. 5, 2009) (DOUCHEBAG AWARD) (stating that because the mark is
clearly not referencing the personal hygiene meaning of the word, use of the mark supports the vulgar
meaning).
172. Office Action, U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78/643,827 (Office Action Aug. 24, 2oo6)
(FUCK.XXX). The examiner used the fact that he found other scandalous websites while searching for
the mark as support for the proposition that anyone may come across these goods and services: "The
examining attorney himself, in searching for the term FUCKXXX readily encountered a number of sites
where, even if not directly entered, clearly displayed a scandalous connotation of the term in relation to
sexual activity." Id. The examining attorney did not address the consideration that he encountered those
websites while specifically searching for the term "fuck.xxx."
173. U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78/643,827 (filed June 5, 2005) (FUCK.XXX).
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purchasers or audience away from using or purchasing the applicant's
identified goods or services. "1
Compounding the confusion is a lower burden of proof for
"egregious" marks, which is an undefined and inconsistently applied
standard. Under In re Wilcher Corp., the amount of proof required to
support a refusal based on scandalousness depends upon the nature of
the mark, with less evidence required for more egregious marks.' This
standard is applied inconsistently when it is applied at all, and often no
information is given to permit either the current applicant or any further
applicants to determine what constitutes "egregious.", 6 Examining
attorneys frequently provide no explanation as to why a particular mark
is considered "egregious."' The word "fuck" appears most likely to be
found "egregious," but is also equally likely not to be held egregious."
Even when a reason is provided, there does not appear to be consistency
in the reasoning. For example, in two marks involving the term "donkey
punch," egregiousness was based on the implication of a violent sex act.
Additionally, egregiousness was found in the mark THE COCK MEAT
174. Id. The examiner stated that websites are ubiquitous and can be accessed by anyone noting
that the attorney found several other scandalous sites while searching for the term "fuckxxx." Id. The
examiner uses this to support the proposition that anyone may come across these goods and services,
but does not seem to take into consideration that s/he was specifically searching for the term
"fuckxxx" on the internet. Office Action, U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78/643,827 (Office
Action Aug. 24, 2oo6).
175. In re Wilcher Corp., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1929, 1996 WL 725479 (T.T.A.B. 1996). The Board stated
that "inclusion in a mark of a readily recognizable representation of genitalia certainly pushes the mark a
substantial distance along the continum [sic] from marks which are relatively innocuous to those which
are most egregious." Id. at *6.
176. U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78/864,664 (filed Apr. 19, 2oo6) (MR. HORSE COCK);
U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 77/605,025 (filed Oct. 31, 2oo8) (IMMANASSHOLE); U.S.
Trademark Application Serial No. 77/079,909 (filed Jan. io, 2oo8) (FUCKTUBE); (FUCK CANCER);
U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78/703,973 (filed Aug. 31, 2005) (FUCK EVERYBODY); U.S.
Trademark Application Serial No. 78/955,927 (filed Aug. 19, 2oo6) (FUCK OFF); U.S. Trademark
Application Serial No. 78/965104 (filed Aug. 31, 2oo6) (A NIGGER FOR LIFE); U.S. Trademark
Application Serial No. 78/666,012 (filed Jul. 7, 2005) (SCHLONG WEAR); U.S. Trademark Application
Serial No. 77/485,121 (filed May 28, 2oo8) (ASSHOLE); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No.
78/643,827 (filed Jun. 5, 2005) (FUCK.XXX); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78/631,791 (filed
May 17, 2005) (MY SH!T D*N'T STINK); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78/866,347 (filed Apr.
20, 2oo6) (FUGLY).
177. See all examples cited, supra note 176.
178. U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 77/618,080 (filed Nov. 19, 2oo8) (FUCKSTRONG) (fuck
is a highly offensive, vulgar slang word); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 77/928,592 (filed Feb. 4,
20o) (DRUNK DUMB FUCKS) (fucks and fuck are obscene and therefore egregiously scandalous).
But, see the following trademark application records that do not contian a rejection including
egregiousness: U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 86/744,789 (filed Sept. 2, 2015) (FUCK YOU PAY
ME); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 86/958,035 (filed Mar. 3, 2016) (FUCK YEAH) (action
suspended pending Supreme Court review of In re Tam, 8o8 F.3 d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2015)).
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SANDWICH SHOP, because there was no other meaning for the phrase
at issue.'79
Initial refusals evaluating a mark out of context have serious
implications for the ultimate dispensation of the application. Applicants
are unlikely to respond to a refusal based on scandalousness.so Research
has indicated that of those applicants who did file an Office Action
response, contextual factors were the most common argument used in
support of registration.'8 ' In fact, context was argued in sixty-four percent
of all responses in a dataset created for one of my previous works.8
These arguments, however, are unlikely to succeed: out of 232 records
reviewed, only two such arguments were ultimately successful.' 83 Further,
examiners were no more likely to address contextual factors in
subsequent Office Actions even when an applicant had filed a response
containing an argument based on context.8 4
IV. RELEVANCE OF CONTEXT IN TRADEMARK REGISTRATION
Trademarks are nothing without context. Context is a central aspect
of trademark law, and is critical in defining the very existence of
trademark rights and their scope. As previously discussed, trademark
rights are not rights in gross, but rights appurtenant to a particular
business. They only exist in so far as they identify the source of particular
goods and services. Marketplace context is a significant consideration at
each stage of the trademark lifecycle, including acquisition, scope,
maintenance, and termination of rights.
The very scope of trademark rights depends on contextual factors
such as the appearance of the mark, the goods or services involved, the
relevant marketplace, and the channels of trade. In stark contrast to the
179. U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 86/936,441 (filed Mar. io, 2016) (DONKEY PUNCH)
(refers to a sexual practice that involves violent physical abuse); U.S. Trademark Application Serial
No. 78/856,809 (filed Apr. 20, 2016) (doNKEy punCH) (term is considered to be associated with
violence and violent sex); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 85/038,983 (filed May 14, 2010)
(THE COCK MEAT SANDWICH SHOP) (there are no other meanings for the phrase at issue).
18o. Carpenter & Garner, supra note i, at 346-47 (finding that more than three-quarters of
applicants whose marks were refused for scandalousness failed to respond to the Office Action).
181. Id. at 348.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 350 n.127 ("Because of the vague standard and the little evidence required to sustain a
rejection for scandalousness (dictionary definitions), it is very difficult for applicants to overcome a
rejection on this basis in the registration process. The only marks that have overcome a rejection based
on scandalousness are WHITE ASS, and FUGLY FRUITS. U.S. Trademark Application Serial No.
85/ioo,568 (filed Aug. 5, 2010) (WHITE ASS); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78/736,643
(filed Oct. 19, 2005) (FUGLY FRUITS). PHAG was initially rejected and abandoned, but when
revived went through with no apparent rejection. U.S. Trademark Registration No. 4,135,694. The
applications for WHITE ASS and FUGLY FRUITS were later abandoned for other reasons.").
184. Id. at 355. While sixty-four percent of Office Action responses argued contextual factors,
when the examiner had not discussed context in the initial Office Action, subsequent Office Actions
were only fifty percent likely to address the contextual argument. Id.
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application of the registration bar for scandalous marks, contextual
factors are regularly considered throughout the trademark registration
process with respect to other bases for rejection, including likelihood of
confusion, descriptiveness, functionality, and distinctiveness. The
application of contextual factors to other registration bars provides a
template for doing so with regard to scandalous marks. The discussion in
the following Subparts highlights the ways in which examiners apply
contextual factors throughout the registration process, in particular with
regard to the section 2(d) bar for likelihood of confusion.
A. THE SECTION 2(D) BAR FOR LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION CENTERS
ON AN ANALYSIS OF CONTEXTUAL FACTORS
The proper focus of a likelihood of confusion analysis is the overall
impression of a mark as it is likely to be perceived by prospective
purchasers.'" Core to the likelihood of confusion analysis is the mantra
that a mark must be examined in the context in which it appears in the
,86
marketplace to the ordinary consumer. In fact, the substantive DuPont
factors cited as most relevant in an ex parte examination evaluate a mark
in light of the overall market context. Those factors include: (I)
"appearance, sound connotation, and commercial impression" of the
marks; (2) goods or services at issue; (3) "established, likely-to-continue
trade channels;" (4) "conditions under which and buyers to whom sales
are made;" and (5) other uses of similar marks in the marketplace.'8 '
-. Examiners Routinely Consider the Appearance of Marks in
the Context of Information Contained in the Application
In contrast to refusals based on scandalousness, refusals based on
likelihood of confusion typically evaluate the mark in context. Because
the likelihood of confusion analysis looks to the actual use of marks, a
comparison of the texts of two marks alone is insufficient if the marks
185. Paula Payne Prods. Co. v. Johnson Publ'g Co., 473 F.2d 901, 902 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (holding that
SPRAY 'N' GLOW mark on hair conditioner and hair brightener spray were sufficiently similar to
mark SPRAY 'N STAY for hair spray, so as to create likelihood of confusion). For an analysis of this
principle in the infringement context, see Sun-Fun Prods., Inc. v. Suntan Research & Dev., Inc., 656
F.2d 186, 192 (5th Cir. 1981); Dreyfus Fund Inc. v. Royal Bank of Canada, 525 F. Supp. iio8, 1112
(S.D.N.Y. 1981).
186. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 2I(a)(i) (AM. LAW. INST. 1995).
187. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, § 1207.01 (Apr. 2016). The other factor is "a valid consent
agreement between the applicant and the owner of the previously registered mark." (citations
omitted). Id. In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F-3 d 1311, 1315, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d I20I, 1204 (Fed. Cir.
2003) ("Not all of the DuPont factors may be relevant or of equal weight in a given case, and 'any one
of the factors may control a particular case,' In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F-3 d 1405, 1406-07, 41
U.S.P.Q.2d 1531, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1997).").
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have different appearances in the marketplace.'88 In an infringement
context, the comparison of marks seeks to replicate the appearance of
the mark under the market conditions in which the marks are
encountered by prospective purchasers. 8 9 In the registration context, the
comparison of marks seeks to do the same to the extent possible based
on the information contained in-and inferred from-the application.'90
For example, the mark SPRAY 'N STAY was found to sufficiently
resemble SPRAY 'N' GLOW for hair care products, despite the
different meanings of the words "stay" and "glow," because the
connotation to the average purchaser of the goods could lead them to
believe that they come from the same source. 9 ' Conversely, the marks
DIGIRAD and DIGIRAY were found to have different connotations so
as not to create a likelihood of confusion because the particular
purchasers of the products could easily distinguish based on the
connotations of -RAY and -RAD in connection with the respective
parties' goods. 9 2 Considering what the overall commercial impression of
188. See Luigino's, Inc. v. Stouffer Corp., 170 F.3d 827, 830 (8th Cir.1999); Elvis Presley Enters.,
Inc. v. Capece, 141 F-3 d 188, 198 (5th Cir.1998); Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co.,
799 F.2d 867, 872 (2d Cir.1986).
189. See, e.g., Wynn Oil Co. v. Thomas, 839 F.2d 1183, 1187 (6th Cir. 1988); Calvin Klein Cosmetics
Corp. v. Lenox Labs., Inc., 815 F.2d 500, 504 (8th Cir. 1987). A side-by-side comparison is warranted if the
products are viewed together in the marketplace. See Lever Bros. Co. v. Winzer CO., 326 F.2d 819
(C.C.P.A. 1964). However, a comparison is improper in the "isolated circumstances" of the marketplace.
See Am. Auto. Ass'n v. AAA Ins. Agency, 618 F. Supp. 787,792 (W.D. Tex. 1985). See, e.g., Levi Strauss
& Co. v. Blue Bell, Inc., 632 F.2d 817, 819 (9th Cir. 1980); James Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of Beefeater, Inc.,
540 F.2d 266 (7 th Cir. 1976), appeal after remand, 572 F.2d 574 (7 th Cir. 1978).
190. See, e.g., Paula Payne Prods. Co. v. Johnson Publ'g Co., 473 F.2d 901 (C.C.P.A. 1973); In re
Max Capital Grp. Ltd., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d 1243 (T.T.A.B. 20o0); In re Cynosure, Inc., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d 1644
(T.T.A.B. 2009) (citing Sealed Air Corp. v. Scott Paper Co., 190 U.S.P.Q. io6, io8 (T.T.A.B. 1975)).
191. Paula Payne Prods. Co., 473 F.2d at 901.
192. In re Digirad Corp., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d 1844, 5 (T.T.A.B. 1998). A comparison based on a
dissection of the designations is normally improper in a likelihood of confusion analysis. Chevron
Chem. Co. v. Voluntary Purchasing Grps, Inc., 659 F.2d 695, 704 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S.
1126 (1982). The dominant elements of a mark may strongly impact the general commercial
impression. See, e.g., Burger Chef Sys., Inc. v. Sandwich Chef, Inc., 6o8 F.2d 875 (C.C.P.A. 1979); J & J
Snack Foods Corp. v. McDonald's Corp., 932 F.2d 1460, 1462 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (noting that a common
characteristic of a family of marks used by the plaintiff may itself become associated with the
trademark owner). The court specifically found that McPRETZEL created a likelihood of confusion
with the McDonald's family of trademarks. Id. at 1464. Particularly, when the distinctiveness of the
other's designation is weak, the addition of the defendant's house mark may avoid confusion. See
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. McNeil-P.P.C., Inc., 973 F.2d 1033, 1045-46 (2d Cir. 1992); Gen. Mills,
Inc. v. Kellogg Co., 824 F.2d 622, 626 (8th Cir. 1987). However, in some circumstances the use of a
house mark may not alleviate the likelihood of confusion. See, e.g., Banff, Ltd. v. Federated Dep't
Stores, Inc., 638 F. Supp. 652, 656 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff'd, 841 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1988) (noting that
Defendant's "name is listed in such small print as to lead to the conclusion that it is not the company
name which [the company] is relying to sell these goods but rather the mark which is so similar to that
previously used by the plaintiff. Moreover, the use of a defendant's own name in conjunction with an
otherwise similar mark does not generally excuse the infringement since it may instead simply increase
the misappropriation by linking the defendant's own name to the plaintiff's good will established by its
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a mark is in the eyes of targeted consumers is key to a likelihood of
confusion analysis. In finding a likelihood of confusion between CITY
GIRL and CITY WOMAN, the Board emphasized that purchasers of
CITY GIRL goods would likely assume that CITY WOMAN was a new
line of products from the same source, or was connected with CITY
GIRL in some way. 93 Even with regard to sound, there is some concern
for methods of pronunciation of the public exposed to particular
marks.'94 Marketplace context is a key focus for the first factor in a 2(d)
rejection.
2. Examiners Routinely Consider the Goods and Services
Identified in the Application
As previously discussed, refusals to register a mark based on
scandalousness often fail to consider relevant information related to the
goods or services in question. However, as a trademark is only a right
appurtenant to a particular business, the goods or services at issue are an
important consideration when evaluating the registrability of a
trademark. This consideration can weigh heavily in a likelihood of
confusion analysis. Indeed, the scope of necessary relatedness of goods
or services varies contextually according to the similarity of the marks.
The more similar the marks, the less similar the goods or services need to
be in order to create a likelihood of confusion in the marketplace. "9
In a section 2(d) analysis, examining attorneys consider the
relatedness of the goods based on their identification in the application.96
The operative question is whether consumers would relate the goods of
the relevant marks, which can occur even where goods are not used
together or related in kind.'97 In In re Davey, the Trademark Trial and
Appeal Board ("TTAB") determined that the goods need only be
trademark."). Id. (internal citations omitted); see also W. E. Bassett Co. v. Revlon, Inc., 435 F.2d 656,
662 (2d Cir. 1970); Miles Shoes, Inc. v. R. H. Macy & Co., 199 F.2d 602, 603 (2d Cir. 1952).
193. In re M. Serman & CO., 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1 52 (T.T.A.B. 1984).
194. See Kabushiki Kaisha Hattori Tokeiten v. Scuotto, 228 U.S.P.Q- 461, 462 (T.T.A.B. 1985)
(noting that similarity of sound can be challenging because there is no per se correct method for
determining how the relevant public will pronounce the mark). Here, the Board refused to register the
mark, holding that "the word portion of applicant's mark 'SEYCOS', [sic] is virtually the phonetic
equivalent of opposer's 'SEIKO' mark and is, in fact, the phonetic equivalent of the plural of
opposer's mark." Id.
195. Gen. Mills, Inc. v. Fage Dairy Processing Indus. S.A., 1oo U.S.P.Q.2d 1584, 1597 (T.T.A.B.
20II); In re Iolo Techs., LLC, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d 1498, 1499 (T.T.A.B. 20o0); In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd.,
92 U.S.P.Q.2d 1198 (T.T.A.B. 2009).
196. In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., No. 79046io6, 2oo9 WL 1896059, at *5 (T.T.A.B. June 18,
2009).
197. Id. (considering that the market factor in this analysis was whether the same facilities could
purchase the equipment to be used in the diagnosis of the same patients). "[G]oods that are neither
used together nor related to one another in kind may still 'be related in the mind of the consuming




sufficiently related so that consumers would be likely to assume, upon
encountering the goods under similar marks, that the goods originate
from, are sponsored or authorized by, or are otherwise connected to the
same source. In cases where the applicant's mark is identical to the
registered mark cited, the degree of relatedness between the respective
goods that is necessary to support a finding that the goods are related is
less than it would be if the marks were not identical-there need be only
a viable relationship between the respective goods.98 If goods or services
are related in some manner in the minds of the consumers, marks that
are similar may give rise to a likelihood of confusion.'99 For example, the
TTAB affirmed the rejection of a travel agency's application for
VOGUE based on the likelihood of confusion with VOGUE magazine."o
VOGUE magazine successfully asserted that the travel agency's goods
were related in such a way as to create confusion in the marketplace,
because most of its readers are highly interested in travel, and the
magazine had been running travel articles for seventy years."'
3. Examiners Routinely Consider Channels of Trade
Also, unlike the analysis involved in assessing potentially scandalous
marks, a likelihood of confusion analysis looks at the marketing methods
and channels of distribution used. The significance of trade channels is
based upon where they lead to and whether at the end certain classes of
persons are exposed to the marks in issue under circumstances likely to
198. In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d at 4 (finding by the examining attorney that "it is not
necessary that the respective goods be identical or even competitive in order to find that they are related
for purposes of our likelihood of confusion analysis.... the issue is not whether consumers would confuse
the goods themselves, but rather whether they would be confused as to the source of the goods."
(citing In re Rexel Inc., 223 U.S.P.Q. 830 (T.T.A.B. 1984))).
199. Weider Publ'ns, LLC v. D & D Beauty Care Co., No. 99199352, 2014 WL 343269, at *io
(T.T.A.B. Jan. 21, 2014) (finding that an applicant's attempt to register SHAPE for not only cosmetics,
but also health spa services and wellness, would likely cause confusion with the magazine SHAPE where
those types of services were featured and advertised). "It is sufficient that the respective goods and/or
services of the parties are related in some manner, and/or that the conditions and activities surrounding
the marketing of the goods and/or services are such that they would or could be encountered by the same
persons under circumstances that could, because of the similarity of the marks, give rise to the mistaken
belief that they originate from the same source." Id. Joel Gott Wines, LLC v. Rehoboth Von Gott, Inc.,
91197659, 2013 WL 5407313, at *8 (T.T.A.B. June 26, 2013) (finding that GOTT LIGHT for various
non-alcoholic drinks was likely to be confused by consumers with the wine marks: GOTT and JOEL
GOTT). The Board stated that "[t]he goods need only be sufficiently related that consumers would be
likely to assume, upon encountering the goods under similar marks, that the goods originate from, are
sponsored or authorized by, or are otherwise connected to the same source." Id.
2oo. See Conde Nast Publ'ns Inc. v. Vogue Travel Inc., 205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 579, 1979 WL 24922
(T.T.A.B. 1979).
20I. Id. at *2 (providing an account of how many articles related to travel were published each
year and what kind of travel-related phrases-such as VOGUE to Go, PASSIONATE TRAVELER,
Travel Egypt, or Vogue's Travelog-were used).
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result in confusion.2 2 This factor is significant in illuminating what
actually happens in the marketplace and, where other factors are not
particularly probative, channels of distribution become of special
importance. 23
Even when the marks are used in the same venues, a proper
likelihood of confusion analysis will consider goods sold in different
departments and targeted at different purchasers. 2o A likelihood of
confusion analysis can narrow the focus of the marketplace to particular
areas where the goods are sold, or where two marks may overlap. For
example, an exclusive distributorship-which in turn sells to the public
exclusively through boutique or specialty stores-can overlap with a
mass marketed product sold through specialty shops, discount stores,
drug stores, and other retail outlets.05 When sold in the same stores,
competing products with similar trade dress may easily be confused if
proximately located or actually intermixed. The consumer may not even
realize the opportunity for comparison and differentiation.26 On the
other hand, it has become a common practice for retailers to shelve
202. See, e.g., Jeanne-Marc, Inc. v. Cluett, Peabody & Co., 221 U.S.P.Q. 58, 61 (T.T.A.B. 1984);
TCPIP Holding Co. v. Haar Commc'ns, Inc., 244 F.3 d 88, 91 (2d Cir. 2001) (targeting similar buyers);
Motion Picture Ass'n of Am. Inc. v. Respect Sportswear, Inc., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d 1555, 1562 (T.T.A.B.
2007) ("[E]ncountered by the same persons . . . .").
203. Homeowners Grp., Inc. v. Home Mktg. Specialists, Inc., 931 F.2d iioo, i1o (6th Cir. 1991)
("This factor... consists of considerations of how and to whom the respective goods or services of the
parties are sold."). For example, if similar marks are used on goods sold through the same marketing
channels, the probability of confusion may be higher than if the goods are marketed through separate
channels. See Interpace Corp. v. Lapp, Inc., 721 F.2d 460 (3 d Cir. 1983) (noting that similar sales contexts
can enhance the likelihood of confusion); see, e.g., Bos. Athletic Ass'n v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 22, 28 (Ist Cir.
1989) (noting that identical nature of sales outlets and advertising methods supported a finding of
infringement). Thus, dissimilarities between the retail outlets for, and the predominant customers of,
plaintiff's and defendant's goods lessen the possibility of confusion, mistake, or deception. Ross
Bicycles, Inc. v. East Coast Cycles, Inc., 224 U.S.P.Q. 725, 728 (N.D. Fla. 1984), aff'd, 765 F.2d 1502,
1507 (iith Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1013 (1986). Accordingly, similar marks used on goods sold
through single-brand distributors may be less confusing than when used on goods sold through multi-
brand stores, and goods sold only at discount outlets might not be confused with goods sold only in
specialty shops.
204. Vitarroz Corp. v. Borden, Inc., 644 F.2d 960, 966-67 (2d Cir. 1981). There is no rule that
separation avoids confusion. Rather, the degree of physical proximity between two products in
different sections of the same stores is relevant only to the extent it involves the consumer's reliance
on memory or affects the consumer's perceptions of the relatedness of the products. Plus Prods. v. Plus
Disc. Foods, Inc., 722 F.2d 999, oo7-o8 (2d Cir. 1983). Helene Curtis Indus., Inc. v. Suave Shoe Corp.,
13 U.S.P.Q.2d 1618, 1624 1.30 (T.T.A.B. 1989) ("The crucial question here is whether source
confusion is likely. As to that, whether or not the goods are displayed close together or far apart in the
same store is immaterial.").
205. Pignons S. A. de Mecanique de Precision v. Polaroid Corp., 657 F.2d 482, 488 (ist Cir. 1981).
206. Roulo v. Russ Berrie & Co., 886 F.2d 931, 937 (7 th Cir. 1989); Storck USA, L.P. v. Farley Candy
Co., 785 F. Supp. 730, 734-35 (N.D. Ill. 1992); P.T.C. Brands, Inc. v. Conwood Co., L.P., 28 U.S.P.Q.2d
1895, 1904 (W.D. Ky. 1993); see Ty, Inc. v. Jones Grp., 237 F-3 d 891, 900-1i (7 th Cir. 2001).
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national brand products side-by-side with private brands having similar
packaging features.2
The analysis looks at trade channels specifically enough that a
likelihood of confusion may be found even on non-competing goods.
Targeting of a relatively narrow universe of potential purchasers through
a specific trade channel may lead to confusion even if the goods do not
compete.os Conversely, likelihood of confusion has been avoided where
the senior and junior marks appear on products sold in professional,
wholesale, or industrial channels as opposed to ordinary consumer retail
channels.2 9 The channels may be such that the only persons in a position
to confuse the marks would be those familiar with one mark in their
trade or industry that happen to encounter the other mark in their
business or perhaps when doing their personal retail shopping. Such
persons may be relatively sophisticated-at least as to the industrial
goods-and less likely to be confused.10
4. Examiners Routinely Consider the Consumer Base
Likelihood of confusion analysis also considers the level of
sophistication of the targeted consumer base. Examining attorneys
consider consumers' sophistication relative to relevant trade channels.
Their analysis recognizes that people who are sophisticated purchasers of
a product in one trade channel may be ordinary consumers of a product
in another channel.2 "' The fact that a product or service is expensive, or
sold to a more specialized group of consumers, does not necessarily mean
that such "sophisticated" consumers are immune to confusion.2 2 When
products may be purchased by both sophisticated and unsophisticated
consumers, the examining attorney will likely look at the group of
consumers that is least sophisticated and base the decision on the
207. Conopco, Inc. v. May Dep't Stores Co., 46 F-3 d 1556, 1564-65 (Fed. Cir. 1994); cf. Kroger Co.
v. Johnson & Johnson, 570 F. Supp 1055 (S.D. Ohio 1983); Gray v. Meijer, Inc., 295 F-3 d 641, 650 (6th
Cir. 2002) (finding no confusion because store brands grouped separately from independent brands,
albeit in the "same basic area" of the store).
208. See Marathon Mfg. Co. v. Enerlite Prods. Corp., 767 F.2d 214, 226 (5th Cir. 1985) (restricted
market, very similar marks).
209. Am. Cyanamid Co. v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 729 F. Supp. ioi8, IO28 (D.N.J. 1989)
(insecticide sold at retail and to exterminators); In re Shipp, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d 1174, 1176 (T.T.A.B. 1987)
(retail dry cleaning services and commercial dry cleaning machine filters).
2Io. In re Shipp, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1176.
211. However, an applicant may not restrict the scope of the goods covered in the cited
registration; rather, trademark owners are limited to the identification of goods and services contained
in the application. In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d 1198, 1204 (T.T.A.B. 2009) ("[I]t is the
identification of goods that controls, not what extrinsic evidence may show about the specific nature of
the goods .... An applicant may not restrict the scope of the goods covered in the cited registration by
argument or extrinsic evidence." (citing In re Peregrina Ltd., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d 1645, 1646 (T.T.A.B.
2008))).
212. See id.; In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d 1266, 1272 (T.T.A.B. 2009); In re N.A.D.
Inc., 754 F.2d 996, 999-ooo (Fed. Cir. 1985).
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examination of the potential for likelihood of confusion within that
group. 213 Circumstances indicating that consumers would exercise care
when purchasing relevant goods tend to minimize the likelihood of
confusion. 24
The appropriate consumer base is considered in conjunction with
relevant trade channels. As such, it may include people who are not
targeted by the trademark owner but who are exposed to the mark in
question. For example, in Stone Lion Capital Partners v. Lion Capital the
examining attorney found that even though the company providing
financial services targeted only sophisticated investors, unsophisticated
consumers seeking financial advice would also likely be exposed to the
trademark. In another case, the Federal Circuit found a high level of
sophistication where medical products would be purchased only in
consultation with anesthesiologists or other professionals with technical
knowledge.21 6
B. OTHER BASES FOR REFUSAL REGULARLY CONSIDER CONTEXTUAL
FACTORS THROUGHOUT THE REGISTRATION PROCESS
Contextual factors are key to the application of other registration
bars as well, including, among others, descriptiveness, genericism, and
functionality. Trademarks are typically evaluated with reference to the
goods and services at issue. As a baseline, trademarks must be
distinctive; distinctiveness is measured by evaluating the mark in relation
to the specific goods or services listed in the application. Marks that are
merely descriptive of the goods or services thus cannot be registered on
the principal register absent a showing of secondary meaning, which is
evaluated pursuant to further contextual information-what is in the
minds of consumers.2 8 The determination of whether a mark is merely
213. Stone Lion Capital Partners, L.P. v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F-3 d 1317, 1323-24 (Fed. Cir. 2014);
see also Gen. Mills, Inc. v. Fage Dairy Processing Indus. S.A., oo U.S.P.Q.2d 1584, 1600 (T.T.A.B.
20II), judgment set aside on other grounds, iio U.S.P.Q.2d 1679 (T.T.A.B. 2014); cf. Ford Motor Co. v.
Summit Motor Prods., Inc., 930 F.2d 277, 293 (3 d Cir. 1991) (stating, in the context of a trademark
infringement case, that "when a buyer class is mixed, the standard of care to be exercised by the
reasonably prudent purchaser will be equal to that of the least sophisticated consumer in the class.").
214. In re Homeland Vinyl Prods., Inc. 81 U.S.P.Q.2d 1378, 1380 (T.T.A.B. 2oo6).
215. Stone Lion Capital Partners, 746 F.3 d at 1323-24. The Federal Circuit held that, because the
services could be "consumed" by sophisticated and unsophisticated consumers alike, the TTAB
correctly found likelihood of confusion. Id. at 1320.
216. In re N.A.D., 754 F.2d at 999-0ooo.
217. 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (2oo6) ("No trademark by which the goods of the applicant may be
distinguished from the goods of others shall be refused registration on the principal register on account of
its nature unless it ... (e) Consists of a mark which (I) when used on or in connection with the goods of
the applicant is merely descriptive or deceptively misdescriptive of them... "); U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK
OFFICE, TMEP § 1209.01 (Apr. 2016) (citing Remington Prods., Inc. v. N. Am. Philips Corp., 892 F.2d
1576, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).
218. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f); TMEP § I209.o(b); TMEP §§ I212 etseq.
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descriptive must be made in relation to the goods or services, not in the
abstract: "This requires consideration of the context in which the mark is
used or intended to be used in connection with those goods/services, and
the possible significance that the mark would have to the average
purchaser of the goods or services in the marketplace."2 19
Like a merely descriptive mark, a generic mark cannot be registered
because it fails to function as a trademark.220 The two-part test to
determine whether or not a trademark is generic is a contextual one. It
looks at the class of goods or services at issue, and asks whether the
relevant public understands the designation primarily to refer to that
class of goods or services."' Marks cannot be registered at all if they are
found to be generic. Generic terms are understood by the relevant
purchasing public to be the common or categorical name for the goods or
services.
Functional elements cannot be protected as a trademark or as trade
dress.2 23 Like the other bases for refusal of registration, the test for
functionality is highly based on contextual factors.2 A proper assessment
of functionality includes evidence both within and beyond the trademark
application."' A mark will be functional where it is "essential to the use
or purpose of the product or if it affects the cost or quality of the
device.,22 6 The examining attorney must establish a prima facie case for
functionality, which can then be rebutted by the applicant.2 Contextual
evidence is key, and may include: (I) the existence of a utility patent
whose claims cover the features sought to be registered; (2) promotional
material touting the utilitarian advantages of the design; (3) availability
of alternative designs for competitors; and (4) whether the design is
219. TMEP § I209.o(b).
220. 15 U.S.C. § 1052. The statute requires that a mark distinguish the applicant's goods or services
in order to be registered; because a generic term refers to an entire class of goods, it cannot be
distinctive.
221. TMEP § I2o9.oi(c)(I) (citing H. Marvin Ginn Corp. v. Int'l Ass'n of Fire Chiefs, Inc., 782
F.2d 987, 990 (Fed. Cir. 1986)).
222. Id. § i209.o(c) (noting that "[g]eneric terms are terms that the relevant purchasing public
understands primarily as the common or class name for the goods or services. In re Dial-A-Mattress
Operating Corp., 240 F.3 d 1341, 57 USPQ2d 18o7, 1811 (Fed. Cir. 2001)." (citations omitted)).
223. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(5).
224. TMEP § I2o2.o2(a)(v) (Apr. 2016) ("In general terms, trade dress is functional, and cannot
serve as a trademark, if a feature of that trade dress is 'essential to the use or purpose of the article or
if it affects the cost or quality of the article.' Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 165, 34
USPQ2d ii61, 1163-64 [sic] (1995) (quoting Inwood Labs. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 85o, n.io,
214 USPQ 1, 4, n.io (1982)).").
225. Id. § i202.02(a)(v).
226. Qualitex Co., 514 U.S. at 165.
227. TMEP § I202.02(a)(iv) (citing Textron, Inc. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 753 F.2d 1o9, 1025
(Fed. Cir. 1985)).
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. . . .228
comparatively simple, efficient, or inexpensive. Context is so important
to the functionality analysis that examining attorneys are instructed not
to just examine the specimen(s) submitted by the applicant, but to ask
the applicant to submit contextual information outside the application,2 2 9
and to conduct independent research to find advertising or promotional
material. 23 o
C. LIKE OTHER BASES FOR REFUSAL, THE BAR TO REGISTRATION OF
SCANDALOUS MARKS SHOULD CONSIDER CONTEXTUAL FACTORS
For a rejection based on morality, trademark examiners should do
what they do across the spectrum of trademark law: evaluate the
trademark in light of the overall market context in which the mark is
used. Trademark examiners are accustomed to this analysis; they do it
regularly to evaluate whether a mark is eligible for registration, including
considering the goods and services in the context of the relevant
marketplace, channels of trade, and the relevant purchasing public-in
some situations, such as an evaluation of functionality, going well beyond
information contained in the application. Consideration of these
contextual factors would lead to better results for refusals based on
scandalousness as they do for other registration bars.
V. CONTEXT IN OTHER FORMS OF CONTENT REGULATION
Consideration of context for scandalous marks would be consistent
with other forms of content regulation. The Federal Communications
Commission ("FCC") has moved toward consideration of context in its
broadcast regulations. The FCC regulation of broadcast content has
often been criticized by popular culture and the media, perhaps best
known through George Carlin's 1972 monologue, Filthy Words.23 '
However, even within these oft-criticized regulations there is a move
away from a categorical judgment based on the "seven words" and
toward some consideration of the general context and market for the
broadcast content. Furthermore, the Supreme Court and the FCC have
very clearly stated that whether something is patently offensive is
228. In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1340-41 (C.C.P.A. 1982); see
TMEP § I2o2.o2(a)(v).
229. TMEP § I2o2.o2(a)(v) ("T]he examining attorney should: (i) ask the applicant to provide
copies of any patent(s) or any pending or abandoned patent application(s); (2) ask the applicant to
provide any available advertising, promotional, or explanatory material concerning the goods/services;
(3) inquire of the applicant whether alternative designs are available; and (4) inquire whether the
feature makes the product easier or cheaper to manufacture.").
230. Id.
231. F.C.C. v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 751-55 (1978) (transcript of monologue); George
Carlin, 7 Dirty Words, YouTUBE (Jan. II, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FMkNsMMvrqk
(discussing the following seven words: shit, piss, fuck, cunt, cocksucker, motherfucker, and tits).
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determined in the context of the specific broadcast and market, rather
than in the abstract.
A. HISTORY OF REGULATION OF BROADCAST CONTENT AND MORALITY
The FCC regulates broadcast content based on both obscenity and
indecency.232 The FCC has separate categories for each of these types of
content; obscenity is flatly prohibited while indecency is regulated.233
Indecent broadcasts, which contain content that would be subject to a
2(a) rejection for scandalousness or immorality if contained in a
trademark, are statutorily permitted between the hours of lo:oo p.m. and
6:oo a.m. 234 Obscene material, on the other hand, is subject to a three-
pronged test in an effort to determine whether the material is of a
prurient nature and lacking in literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value.235
When determining indecency, the focus is mainly on the material's
effect on children and whether the material is patently offensive.236 In
both cases, when determining if material is prurient or patently offensive,
the proper standard is that of the "contemporary community" which is
non-geographical and includes the average broadcast viewer or
listener. 23 7
i. There Has Been a Consistent Increase in the Use
of Context to Determine Regulation of Broadcast
Content Based on Offensiveness
Although a general definition of indecency was adopted a few years
before, the standard for regulation of morality in broadcast content was
established in 1978.238 The Pacifica standard focused on the legendary
"seven words" and a prohibition on indecent content between the hours
232- 47 C.F.R § 73-3999 (1995) ("Enforcement of 18 U.S.C. 1464 (restrictions on the transmission of
obscene and indecent material)"); Obscene, Indecent and Profane Broadcasts, F.C.C., http/www.fcc.gov/
guides/obscenity-indecency-and-profanity (last updated June 30, 2016); Regulation of Obscenity, Indecency
and Profanity, F.C.C., https://www.fcc.gov/general/regulation-obscenity-indecency-and-profanity (last visited
Nov. 7,2016).
233. Obscene, Indecent and Profane Broadcasts, supra note 232; Regulation of Obscenity,
Indecency and Profanity, supra note 232; 47 C.F.R. § 73.3999 ("(a) No licensee of a radio or television
broadcast station shall broadcast any material which is obscene. (b) No licensee of a radio or television
broadcast station shall broadcast on any day between 6 a.m. and io p.m. any material which is
indecent.").
234- 47 C.F.R § 73-3999-
235. Obscene, Indecent and Profane Broadcasts, supra note 232; 47 C.F.R. § 73.4165 (1994)
("Obscene language").
236. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 726.
237. Id.
238. Id. (holding that the government can constitutionally regulate indecent broadcasts, and
providing the foundation for FCC enforcement of indecent material).
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of 6:oo a.m. and 10:00 p.m.239 A decade later, the FCC determined that
this interpretation of the Pacifica standard was too narrow and needed to
accommodate contextual considerations. 20  The FCC reiterated the
original indecency standard: "language that describes in terms patently
offensive as measured by contemporary community standards for the
broadcast medium, sexual or excretory activities and organs. ,2" The FCC
also emphasized that the focus was on impact on children and repetition
of expletives, indicating that fleeting or isolated use weighed
against-but did not prohibit-a finding of indecency. In 2001, the FCC
issued a policy statement clarifying the indecency standard and stating a
factor test for determining if something is indecent.243 The three main
factors, though these are non-exhaustive and the FCC or courts may take
into account other factors, are as follows: "(I) the explicitness or graphic
nature of the description or depiction ... ; (2) whether the material
dwells on or repeats at lenghth [indecent] descriptions ... ; (3) whether
material appears to pander or is used to titillate, or whether the material
appears to be presented for shock value. 2" The focus is on the contextual
meaning; innuendo and double entendres can be indecent if the meaning
is clear and unmistakable .2 " Toward that end, the FCC reiterated that
fleeting or isolated use would weigh against a finding of indecency, but
would not preclude it.24 6
239. Id.
240. In re Citizen's Complaint Against Pacifica Found., 56 F.C.C.2d. 94, 98 (1975) (providing that
the definition of indecent language is "language that describes in terms patently offensive as measured
by contemporary community standards for the broadcast medium, sexual or excretory activities and
organs").
241. Id.
242. The FCC also sought to do away with strict time periods, because children could still be
exposed after io p.m. In 1995, in response to congressional and court rulings, the io:oo p.m. to 6:oo
a.m. rule was reinstated and codified at 47 C.F.R. § 73-3999 (1995).
243. Industry Guidance on Interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 1464, 16 FCC Rcd. 7999 (2001).
244. Id. at 8003. Under this standard, fleeting or single use would weigh against a finding of
indecency, but may still be indecent where other factors contribute to a finding of patent
offensiveness, such as broadcasting references to sexual activities with children and material that is
graphic or explicit.
245. Id. at 8002-03.
246. See F.C.C. v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 509 (2009). In 2003, the FCC initially
found that isolated use of the word "fuck" in a Golden Globes broadcast, because it was used as an
expletive rather than descriptor of sex, and because the word was isolated rather than repeated, was
not indecent. In 2004, the FCC appeals panel overturned that ruling, finding that "fuck" was "one of
the most vulgar, graphic and explicit descriptions of sexual activity in the English language" and "any
use of that word ... inherently has a sexual connotation," thus, isolated use of such a word does not
preclude a finding of indecency. Id. at 508-o9. This removed the requirement that a broadcast must
dwell on or repeat an expletive in order to be found indecent. Complaints Against Various Broadcast
Licensees Regarding the "Golden Globe Awards," 18 FCC Rcd. 19859 (2003).
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Overall, the definitions of what is indecent or obscene have not
changed, but enforcement has become broader.2 " The focus within
enforcement is primarily on protecting children, but context is key.24s The
analysis includes the time and place that the program is aired, the place
247. The Motion Picture Association of America ("MPAA"), on the other hand, does appear to have
altered what it determines to meet each category over time. Complaints Against Various Licensees
Regarding the "Golden Globe Awards," 19 FCC Rcd. 4975 (2004). Harvard published a report in 2004
indicating "ratings creep" and that, over the previous decade, the amount of sex and violence permitted in
lower ratings categories had increased. Violence appears to be the primary beneficiary, lower ratings having
larger amounts of violence than before, while sex and sexual references are still considered more scandalous
and more likely to garner a higher rating (though still more acceptable at lower ratings than previously).
Kimberly H. Thompson & Fumie Yokota, Violence, Sex, and Profanity in Films: Correlation of Movie
Ratings with Content, MEDSCAPE GEN. MED. (2004), http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/48o900; Press
Release, Harvard Sch. of Pub. Health, Study Finds "Ratings Creep": Movie Ratings Categories Contian
More Violence, Sex, Profanity than Decade Ago (July 13, 2004), http://archive.sph.harvard.edu/press-
releases/archives/2004-releases/presso7[32004.html; Nell Minow, Movie 'Ratings Creep' Means PG-13 Isn't
What It Used to Be, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Aug. 13, 2004), http/articles.chficagotribune.com/2oo4-o8-
13/features/o4o83o92_Ijpotentially-objectionable-content-mpaa-ratings-movie; Sharon Waxman, Study
Finds Film Ratings Are Growing More Lenient, N.Y. TIMES (July 14, 2oo4), http://www.nytimes.com/
2004/07/I4/movies/study-finds-film-ratings-are-growing-more-lenient.html; Mike Snider, Harvard Study Is
First to Measure 'Ratings Creep,' USA TODAY (July 13, 2004, ii:o6 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/
life/movies/news/2004-o7-13-harvard-ratings-creep_x.htm; Assoc. PRESS, 'Ratings Creep' Found Prevalent,
L.A. TIMES (July 15, 2004), http://articles.latimes.com/2004/jul/I5/news/wk-quickl5.4. The Entertainment
Software Ratings Board ("ESRB") has seen a similar shift in what is acceptable for different levels of ratings
though to a lesser extent than the MPAA. For example, blood was previously not allowed in the "Teen"
category but is now permitted so long as it is static and not gratuitous. However, the ESRB also
acknowledges that, though it has shifted what is acceptable based on contemporary views, violence is more
acceptable than sex as far as ratings. The TV Parental Guidance system is actually done by the broadcasters
themselves resulting in inconsistencies in application. Interestingly, in the case of television it appears that
ratings have increased due to a decrease in the stigma of a show with a higher rating. However, with no
centralized ratings board it is hard to say if there has been a shift in what falls under which category. ESRB
Ratings Guide, ENr. SonrWARE RATINGs BOARD, http://www.esrb.org/ratings/ratingsguide.jsp (last visited
Nov. 7, 2016); see also Telephone Interview with Patricia Vance, President, Entm't Software Ratings Board
(Sept. E6, 2014); HeatherNewman, Twenty Years of ESRB: More Blood, Less Hassle for Developers
(Interview), VENTUREBEAT (Sept. E6, 2014, 3:0o AM), http://venturebeat.com/2oI4/o9/16/twenty-years-of-
esrb-more-blood-less-hassle-for-developers-interview/ (providing transcription of Patricia Vance's interview
with VentureBeat); Kyle Orland, 20 Years, 20 Questionable Game Ratings: A Timeline of ESRB Oddities,
ARSTECHNICA (Sept. E6, 2014, 2:oo PM), http://arstechnica.com/gaming/2oi4/o9/2o-years-2o-questionable-
game-ratings-a-timeline-of-esrb-oddities/; Matt Matthews, This Game Is Not yet Rated: Inside the ESRB
Ratings System, GAMASUTRA (Oct. E6, 2007), http://www.gamasutra.com/view/feature/I3o387/this
gameis not-yet-rated_inside_.php?print=I (describing the ratings process and how context is taken into
account).
248. See F.C.C. v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 733 (1978); Action for Children's
Television v. F.C.C., 58 F-3 d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (noting that safe harbor is io:oo p.m. to 6:oo a.m.
because there is no relationship between the distinction of commercial v. noncommercial stations and
the compelling governmentt interest); see also Enforcement of Prohibitions Against Broadcasting
Indecency, 8 FCC Rcd. 704 (1993); 58 Fed. Reg. 5937 (Jan. 25, 1993) (mandating I2:oo a.m. to 6 a.m.
safe harbor instead of io:oo p.m. to 6:oo a.m., overruled by Action for Children's Television v. F.C.C.,
ii F-3 d 170, 171 (D.C. Cir. 1993)); In re Sagittarius Broadcasting Corp., 8 FCC Rcd. 3600, 3600 (1993)
(noting that audience poll not enough to demonstrate lack of child audience because broadcast was
outside new safe harbor limits); Letter to The Rusk Corp., 8 FCC Rcd. 3228, 3229 (1993) (arguing that
the prevalence of sexual content doesn't make the content less indecent, because rules are for
protecting children and not about what adults consider decent for an adult audience).
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of viewing, and the greater context of the broadcast, including the
surrounding content.4
The Supreme Court has established that, to be obscene, material
must meet a three-pronged test, based on contemporary community
standards: (i) An average person, applying contemporary community
standards, must find that the material, as a whole, "appeals to the
prurient interest;" (2) the material must depict or describe, in a patently
offensive way, "sexual conduct specifically defined by applicable law;"
and (3) the material, taken as a whole, must "lack serious literary,
artistic, political or scientific value.",2o The FCC has defined broadcast
indecency as "language or material that, in context, depicts or describes,
in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary community
standards for the broadcast medium, sexual or excretory organs or
activities." 2  Indecent programming contains patently offensive sexual or
excretory material that does not rise to the level of obscenity.* Courts
have held that indecent material is protected by the First Amendment
and cannot be banned entirely.253 It may, however, be restricted in order
to avoid its broadcast during times of the day when there is a reasonable
risk that children may be in the audience.2 4 Currently, even a single
utterance of an expletive-the seven words from Carlin have been stated
as examples rather than an exhaustive list-can still be ruled indecent
depending on the other context of the material. However, there is now a
statutory safe harbor time between io:oo p.m. to 6:oo a.m. 2" The FCC has
defined profanity as "including language so grossly offensive to members
of the public who actually hear it as to amount to a nuisance.",25 6 In
making obscenity, indecency, and profanity determinations, context is
key. The FCC staff must analyze what was actually aired, the meaning of
what was aired, and the context in which it was aired. 5
249. See Obscene, Indecent and Profane Broadcasts, supra note 232; Regulation of Obscenity,
Indecency and Profanity, supra note 232; 47 C.F.R. § 73-3999 (1995).
250. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (redefining obscenity from the previous standard
of "utterly without redeeming social value" to something that lacks "serious literary, artistic, political,
or scientific value") (emphasis omitted).
251. In re Citizen's Complaint Against Pacifica Foundation, 56 F.C.C.2d. 94, 98 (1975).
252. See Obscene, Indecent and Profane Broadcasts, supra note 232.
253. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971) (finding indecent speech protected by the First
Amendment and famously noting that it is "often true that one man's vulgarity is another's lyric").
254. F.C.C. v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749 (1978); Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675,
684 (1986).
255- 47 C.F.R § 73-3999 (1995).





The registration bar for scandalous marks should be removed from
the Lanham Act. It should be removed because morality is outside the
function and purpose of trademark law; the consumer protection at the
heart of trademark law is one of source quality, not moral quality.
Removal of the registration bar would be more consistent with other
forms of intellectual property, which have moved away from regulating
morality. It would also resolve concerns about the provision's
constitutionality.
However, if the bar remains in the Lanham Act, it should be applied
in a way that is fair and effective within the legal framework of
trademark law. In re Mavety Media indicates that scandalousness should
be evaluated in the context of the current attitudes of the day and the
marketplace identified in the application."' However, if the particular
mark contains words that are listed as "vulgar" in the dictionary, that is
sufficient for a 2(a) rejection. Examining attorneys are given these
general guidelines, but they are not very helpful in practical terms.
Examining attorneys should treat a 2(a) question based on
scandalousness or immorality the same way they treat most other issues
in trademark law: through an assessment of the mark in the context of
the marketplace. This would be consistent with other bars to registration
found in the Lanham Act, and forms of content regulation in broadcast
media.
258. In re Mavety Media Grp. Ltd., 33 F-3 d 1367, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
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